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THE FUTURE OF SOURCE-BASED TAXATION OF
THE INCOME OF MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES
Robert A. Greent
One of the functions of the corporate income tax is to raise reve-
nue from foreign persons who earn income domestically through cor-
porate intermediaries. This function is problematical because the tax
base is mobile. Multinational enterprises can avoid one country's cor-
porate income tax by moving their investment to another country.
More significantly, the current international tax system allows mul-
tinationals considerable latitude to leave their investment in place but
to shift the reported source of income. Multinationals can accomplish
this by manipulating the prices that their affiliates charge one another
in intercompany transactions or by strategically arranging their finan-
cial structures.
Congress and the Treasury Department have long been con-
cerned that multinationals might avoid U.S. taxes by manipulating
transfer prices.' This concern has increased in recent years, initially
because of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) lack of success in ap-
plying transfer pricing rules2 to U.S.-based multinationals that transfer
intangible property to foreign affiliates.3 More recently, the concern
has been fueled by statistical evidence indicating that U.S. subsidiaries
of foreign-based multinationals, as a group, report strikingly less taxa-
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1 See U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, A STUDY OF INTERCOMPANY PRIcING 6-12 (1988) (dis-
cussing history of U.S. transfer pricing law and regulations) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER],
reprinted in 75 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 53, at 1 (Oct. 20, 1988).
2 The statutory source of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) authority to adjust
transfer prices is § 482 of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"), which authorizes the
Secretary of the Treasury to allocate income and deductions among commonly controlled
businesses "in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income" of such
businesses. I.R.C. § 482 (West 1988). Treasury regulations under § 482 set forth the appli-
cable standards and methodologies for adjusting transfer prices. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1A
to -2A (as amended in 1993); Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-OT to -7T (1993).
3 See STAFF OFJOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., lST SEss., GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 1011-18 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter 1986
BLUE BOOK] (discussing efforts to limit multinationals' ability to avoid or defer tax by trans-
ferring intangible property).
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ble income than comparable domestically-owned firms.4 In the last
decade, Congress has conducted two hearings on tax underpayments
by U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations5 and has mandated several
Treasury, IRS, and General Accounting Office (GAO) studies of the
effectiveness of the United States' transfer pricing rules.6 Recent ef-
forts to solve the problem of transfer price manipulation have pro-
ceeded along two lines. First, the Treasury has developed new
methodologies for determining whether intercompany prices satisfy
the "arm's length" standard.7 Second, Congress has enacted, and the
4 See generally Harry Grubert et al., Explaining the Low Taxable Income of Foreign-Con-
trolled Companies in the United States (1991) (concluding that IRS statistics provide indirect
evidence that many foreign-based multinationals reduce U.S. taxable income by manipulat-
ing transfer prices), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNI File No. 92 TNI 26-35 (June 24,
1992).
5 See Tax Underpayments by U.S. Subsidiaries of Foreign Companies: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)
[hereinafter 1990 Hearings]. The Subcommittee held further hearings on the same subject
on April 9, 1992. See Opening Statement, Hon. J.J. Pickle, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means (Apr. 9, 1992), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Li-
brary, TNT File No. 92 TNT 77-22 (Apr. 10, 1992).
6 The Conference Committee Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1986 recommended
that the Treasury make a comprehensive study of the § 482 regulations, giving considera-
tion to whether these regulations should be modified. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 841, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11-638 (1986), repinted in 1986 U.S.C.CA.N. 4075. In response, the Treas-
ury and IRS reexamined the theory and administration of § 482, with particular attention
to transfers of intangible property, and released their study on October 18, 1988. WHrrE
PAPER, supra note 1.
In 1990, Congress directed the IRS to examine the effect of recent legislation aimed at
increasing compliance with § 482 and to recommend further legislative or administrative
changes relating to § 482. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
508, § 11316, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-458. The IRS released its report on April 9, 1992. IRS,
REPORT ON THE APPLICATION AND ADMINITRATION OF SErION 482 (1992) [hereinafter IRS
REPORT], available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File No. 92 TNT 77-19 (Apr. 10, 1992).
Responding to a request from SenatorJessie Helms, the ranking minority member of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
prepared a report on the IRS's administration of§ 482, which it released onJune 15, 1992.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: PROBLEMS PERSIST IN DER-
MINING TAX EFFECrs OF INTERCOMPANY PRICES (1992) [hereinafter GAO, INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION].
7 Since 1935, Treasury regulations have called for use of the arm's length standard in
applying § 482. Treas. Reg. 86, § 45-1(b) (1935) (interpreting § 45 of the Revenue Act of
1928, ch. 852, § 45, 45 Stat. 791, 806, the direct predecessor of current § 482); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-1A(b) (1) (as amended in 1993) (interpreting current § 482); Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-IT(b) (1) (1993) (same). Under this standard, the IRS may adjust the transfer
price charged in a transaction between related firms to match the price that unrelated
firms would have charged had they engaged in the same transaction. Id. The United
States' bilateral income tax treaties also call for use of the arm's length standard in allocat-
ing income among related parties. See MODEL INCOME TAX TEA rv OFrJUNE 16, 1981 art. 9
(U.S. Dep't of the Treasury 1981) [hereinafter U.S. MODEL TREATY] (allocation of income
between "associated enterprises"), reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 211 (1990), with-
drawn by Treasury Dep't News Release NB-1990 (July 17, 1992), 1992-13 Stand. Fed. Tax
Rep. (CCH) 1 46,416; see also id. art. 7(2) (allocation of income between an enterprise in
one country and its branch ("permanent establishment") in another country). The arm's
length standard has become the nominal international norm for making such allocations,
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Treasury Department and the IRS have implemented, new enforce-
ment and penalty measures.8
Congress has devoted much less attention to the possibility that
multinationals minimize U.S. taxes by strategically arranging their
capital structures. This financial maneuvering tends to be much less
visible than transfer price manipulation and is generally regarded with
less disapproval. In its recent and limited attack on financial maneu-
vering, Congress has again relied on the arm's length standard.9
These approaches to combatting the tax minimization strategies
of multinationals are based on a short-term and national perspective,
which views the erosion of our country's corporate income tax base as
the primary concern. From a long-term and international perspec-
tive, by contrast, the fundamental concern might be seen as the inher-
although the meaning of the standard is often a matter of controversy. See WHrrE PAPER,
supra note 1, at 56-58.
In the White Paper, the Treasury proposed a new methodology, known as the "arm's
length return method," for implementing the arm's length standard. Id. at 94-102. In
1992, the Treasury issued proposed new regulations under § 482, which introduced a mod-
ified version of the arm's length return method, known as the "comparable profit
method," for implementing the arm's length standard. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)-(f),
57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (1992), withdrawn by INTL-401-88, 1993-10 I.R.B. 60. In 1993, the Treas-
ury issued new temporary regulations under § 482, which prescribe a second modified
version of the arm's length return method, known as the "comparable profits method."
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5T (1993).
8 For example, in 1989, Congress imposed new reporting and record-keeping re-
quirements on certain foreign-controlled corporations. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7403, 103 Stat. 2106, 2358-61 (amending I.R.C.
§ 6038A). Congress expanded these requirements in 1990. Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 11314, 11315, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-455 to 1388-
458 (amending I.R.C. § 6038A and adding I.R.C. § 6038C). Congress also for the first time
enacted penalties for transfer price misstatements. Id. § 11312(a), (b), 104 Stat. at 1388-
454 to 1388-455 (amending I.R.C. § 6662(b) (3), (e), (h) (2) (A)). In addition, Congress
increased the IRS's ability to obtain information relevant to § 482 investigations. Id.
§ 11311, 104 Stat. at 1388-453 (enacting I.R.C. § 6503(k)). In 1991, Congress increased the
IRS's ability to hire outside experts for examinations and litigation in response to concern
that the IRS was "outgunned" by the experts hired by the multinationals. Treasury, Postal
Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-509, § 532,
104 Stat. 1389, 1470 (enacting 41 U.S.C. § 261). In 1993, Congress lowered the thresholds
for triggering the penalties for transfer price misstatements. Revenue Reconciliation Act
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13236 (amending I.R.C. § 6662). The IRS has steadily been
increasing the resources that it devotes to international tax issues and to transfer pricing
issues in particular, often by shifting resources out of domestic examinations. See State-
ment of Shirley D. Peterson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Before the Subcommittee
on Oversight, House Ways and Means Committee, Hearings on Tax Underpayments by
U.S. Subsidiaries of Foreign Corporations (Apr. 9, 1992), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Li-
brary, TNT File No. 92 TNT 77-67, at *6 (Apr. 10, 1992); 1990 Hearings, supra note 5, at 79-
80 (testimony of Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., then Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
9 See H.R. CoNF. REa. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 569-70 (1989) (arguing that the
"earnings stripping" provision enacted as § 163(0) of the Code is consistent with the arm's
length standard), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N 3018, 3172-73.
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ent instability of an international system of source-based corporate
income taxation. 10
The instability of the system is due largely to the incentives for
governmental action created by the possibility of income shifting by
multinationals. Notwithstanding the optimism expressed by Treasury
and IRS officials," it is unlikely that the recent U.S. initiatives will
significantly reduce the ability of multinationals to shift income
through transfer pricing,12 much less reduce their ability to shift in-
come through financial maneuvering. As long as multinationals have
the ability to shift the reported source of their income, governments
imposing source-based corporate income taxes will have an incentive
to compete for this shiftable income. Governments can compete by
aggressively enforcing their transfer price legislation, by penalizing be-
havior that might involve income shifting, or by enacting substantive
tax rules that give multinationals an incentive to shift income to do-
mestic affiliates-in particular, by lowering their corporate income tax
rates. The effectiveness of these actions comes, however, at the ex-
pense of other countries. Moreover, a competition to lower corporate
tax rates would threaten the long-term sustainability of income tax
systems generally.' 3
Assuming, as this Article does, that governments have decided for
domestic reasons to continue to rely on income taxation, 14 efforts
should be directed toward the development of an international tax
system that neutralizes the incentive for multinationals to shift in-
come. One general approach would be to strengthen the current in-
ternational system of source-based corporate income taxation. A
more radical approach would be to recognize that the current difficul-
ties of taxing multinationals do not call for improved implementation
of source-based income taxation, but rather indicate that the basic ap-
10 The current international system of corporate income taxation is not a purely
source-based system, but a hybrid of source-based and residence-based taxation. See infra
text accompanying notes 15-38.
11 See Statement of Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Depart-
ment of the Treasury, Before the Committee on Ways and Means, United States House of
Representatives (Jul. 21, 1992) [hereinafter Statement of Fred T. GoldbergJr.], available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File No. 92 TNT 149-164 (Jul. 22, 1992), at *23; IRS REP oRT,
supra note 6, at *6; John Turro, RS and Treasury Officials Urge Congress to Give Current Trans-
fer-PricingEnforcement Tools Time to Work, 4 TAx NoTEs INT'L 794 (1992).
12 Commentators have long criticized the transfer pricing rules on the ground that
they are indeterminate. See Note, Multinational Corporations and Income Allocation Under Sec-
tion 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, 89 HA.v. L. REv. 1202, 1219-23 (1976). As a general
proposition, indeterminate tax rules are undesirable for a number of reasons: They make
it impossible for taxpayers to plan their transactions with foreknowledge of the conse-
quences; they inevitably lead to costly and time consuming disputes about the application
of the standard to the facts of particular cases; and they erode confidence in the fairness of
the tax system, thereby discouraging voluntary compliance.
13 See infra Part V.B.
14 See infra note 171.
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proach of source-based income taxation is flawed. As an alternative,
nations might agree to forgo taxing the domestic source income of
foreign persons and to move instead to an international system of
purely residence-based income taxation. Under this approach, na-
tions would use the comprehensive income tax as a means of allocat-
ing part of the cost of government among individual residents based
on their ability to pay. Countries could continue to tax foreign per-
sons, but they would not do so by imposing a source-based income tax
dependent on transfer prices or on corporate financial decisions. In-
stead, they would impose taxes that more closely relate to the benefits
that the foreign persons derive from the host country.
This Article analyzes the instability of the international system of
source-based income taxation and develops the case for a residence-
based system as a solution to this problem. Part I of this Article de-
scribes the basic structure of the current international system for tax-
ing multinationals, and discusses the relationship between the arm's
length standard and source-based income taxation. Part II examines
how multinationals are able to minimize their global income tax liabil-
ity by manipulating transfer prices and considers whether the arm's
length standard is a satisfactory means for combatting this manipula-
tion. Part III discusses financial maneuvering and the application of
the arm's length standard to this tax minimization strategy. Part IV
analyzes governmental responses to the arm's length standard and the
long-term implications for the sustainability of an international system
of source-based corporate income taxation.
In Part V, this Article considers possible approaches for enhanc-
ing the stability of international income taxation. Part V begins by
briefly considering the possibility of strengthening the existing system
of source-based corporate income taxation, either through concerted
international tax harmonization or through international adoption of
unitary taxation and formula apportionment. Next, this part analyzes
the radically different approach of moving to an international system
of corporate income taxation based exclusively on the residence of
individual shareholders. This analysis includes a discussion of the
practical difficulties that such an approach would involve, including
the difficulty of reaching international agreement and problems of
implementation and enforcement. Finally, Part V discusses more
modest approaches that the United States could implement unilater-
ally or bilaterally in the short term. These approaches would alleviate
current problems of taxing multinationals and move the U.S. tax sys-
tem toward possible long-term solutions, including residence-based
taxation of corporate income.
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THE RESIDENCE PRINCIPLE, THE SOURCE PRINCIPLE, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION OF
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
Countries generally assert jurisdiction to tax income on the basis
of the residence principle and the source principle.1 5 Under the resi-
dence principle, a nation is entitled to tax its nationals and residents
on their worldwide income. 16 The United States applies the residence
principle to all "United States persons," a term that includes U.S. citi-
zens and domestic corporations as well as U.S. resident individuals.' 7
Under the source principle, a nation is entitled to tax nonresidents on
the income they derive from sources within the country.'8
To prevent double taxation of income from transnational activity,
the residence country conventionally yields tax jurisdiction to the
source country, either unilaterally through its domestic tax law or bi-
laterally through a tax treaty.19 The residence country typically adopts
one or a combination of two mechanisms for this purpose. The first
mechanism exempts residents from taxation on their foreign source
income, or at least on certain types of foreign source income. This is
known as a "territorial" or "exemption" system. 20 The second mecha-
nism grants residents a tax credit, applied against domestic taxes im-
15 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
258 (1986) (noting wide degree of international consensus on the law ofjurisdiction to
tax); AMERucAN LAw INsTrrum, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF
UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II, PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 5
(1992) [hereinafter ALI INCOME TAX TREATY PROJECT].
16 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 412(1) (a) (1986). In the case of the United States, see I.R.C. § 61(a) (West Supp. 1998)
(defining gross income to mean all income "from whatever source derived"). This Article
generally uses the term "resident" to refer to any person subject to tax under the residence
principle.
17 I.R.C. § 7701(a) (30) (West Supp. 1998) (defining "United States person" to mean a
citizen or resident of the United States, a domestic partnership, a domestic corporation,
and any estate or trust other than a foreign estate or foreign trust).
18 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 412(1) (b), (c) (1986); ALI INCOME TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 15, at 5. In the case
of the United States, see I.R.C. § 871 (West Supp. 1993), as amended by Revenue Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13113, 13237 (tax on nonresident alien individu-
als); I.R.C. § 881 (West Supp. 1993) (tax on income of foreign corporations not connected
with U.S. business); I.R.C. § 882 (West Supp. 1993), as amended by Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13237 (tax on income of foreign corporations connected
with U.S. business).
19 See ALI INCOME TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 15, at 5-6.
20 E.g., I.R.C. § 911 (West 1988) (permitting qualified citizens or residents of the
United States living abroad to exclude a portion of their foreign earned income from gross
income subject to U.S. taxation). Countries using a territorial system will typically exempt
foreign source active business income and intercorporate dividends from foreign subsidiar-
ies, at least when received from specified countries.
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posed on foreign source income, 21 for the amount of foreign income
taxes paid.
The application of these principles to multinational enterprises
involves a number of legal formalisms. Consider, for example, the
case of a U.S.-based multinational consisting of a U.S. parent corpora-
tion, P, and a wholly-owned subsidiary, S, incorporated in a foreign
country (the "host country"). Suppose for the sake of simplicity that P
engages in business only in the United States, and that S engages in
business only in the host country. In particular, P might be a U.S.
manufacturer and S its distributor in the host country.
Because P is incorporated in the United States, the United States
will classify P as a "United States person"22 and will tax P on its world-
wide income. The United States will treat S as a separate "person" for
tax purposes. Thus, even though P owns S and economically accrues
income when S accrues income, the United States generally will not
tax P on Ss earnings until they are "repatriated" in the form of a divi-
dend or other payment.23 This treatment is termed "deferral."24 Sim-
21 E.g., I.R.C. §§ 901-908 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993), as amended by Revenue Reconcili-
ation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13227, 13235 (U.S. foreign tax credit).
22 I.R.C. § 7701(a) (4), (a) (30) (C) (West Supp. 1993).
23 In contrast, if P conducted business in the host country through a branch in that
country, the United States would tax P on the income of the branch on an accrual basis,
with a credit for foreign tax paid on the branch's income.
The Code permits a U.S. parent corporation and its domestic affiliates to file a consoli-
dated return and be taxed on their consolidated income, provided that the corporations
are interconnected by at least 80 percent stock ownership. I.R.C. §§ 1501-1505 (West 1988
& Supp. 1993). Foreign corporations, however, generally are not eligible for inclusion in
the affiliated group. Id. § 1503(b) (4). There are limited exceptions for certain foreign
insurance companies and certain corporations organized under the laws of Canada or
Mexico and maintained solely for the purpose of complying with the law of those countries
as to title and operation of property. Id §§ 953(d), 1504(c)-(d).
24 The Code contains several sets of provisions that limit the ability of U.S. sharehold-
ers of foreign corporations to defer U.S. tax on the foreign income of the foreign corpora-
tion. The primary anti-deferral regime is the set of controlled foreign corporation rules in
subpart F of the Code. I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993), as amended by Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13231-13233, 13235, 13239. For other
anti-deferral regimes, see I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993), as amended by Reve-
nue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13201-13202 (accumulated earnings
tax); I.R.C. §§ 541-547 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993), as amended by Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13201-13202 (personal holding company rules); I.R.C.
§§ 551-558 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (foreign personal holding company rules); I.R.C.
§§ 1246-1247 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (foreign investment company rules); I.R.C.
§§ 1291-1297 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993), as amended by Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13231 (passive foreign investment company rules).
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that if corporate income tax liability were
recomputed without the benefit of the deferral of taxation of the income of controlled
foreign corporations, tax revenues would increase by $1.0 billion in Fiscal Year 1993, rising
to $1.2 billion in Fiscal Year 1997. STAFF OFJOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., 2D
Smss., Es-rmATEs OF TAX EXPENDIrruES FOR FIscA.L YEARs 1993-1997, at 11 (Comm. Print
1992). The Treasury estimates that tax revenues would increase by $200 million per year
for Fiscal Years 1991, 1992, and 1993. U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGEr, BuDGET
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ilarly, although S is owned by P, a U.S. corporation that might in turn
be owned by U.S. residents, the United States will treat S as a foreign
person 25 earning foreign source income. Accordingly, the United
States will not assert jurisdiction to tax S.
The host country, in turn, will likely classify S as a resident corpo-
ration and thus will impose its corporate income tax on the income of
S. In addition, the host country will likely assert source jurisdiction to
tax P on any dividends, interest, royalties, and similar payments that it
receives from S. In lieu of imposing its regular corporate income tax
on Pwith respect to this income-an approach that would be difficult
to enforce-the host country will impose a flat-rate tax on the pay-
ments, with no allowance for deductions, and will enforce it by requir-
ing S to withhold the sum from the underlying payments to P. This
tax is referred to as a "withholding tax."2 6
The system described above results in corporate-level taxation of
the earnings of S by both sovereigns. The host country taxes the earn-
ings by imposing its corporate income tax on S. When S eventually
remits the remaining earnings to P by paying a dividend, the host
country taxes the distributed earnings by imposing a withholding tax
on the dividend. The United States taxes P on the distributed earn-
ings by imposing its corporate income tax on the dividend that P
receives.
The United States unilaterally provides relief from this com-
pounding of U.S. and foreign taxation by allowing a "direct" and an
"indirect" foreign tax credit.2 7 Returning to the example above, the
United States allows P to claim a direct foreign tax credit for the with-
holding tax that the host country imposed on the dividend. In addi-
tion, when the dividend is paid, P may claim an indirect foreign tax
credit for the corporate income tax that the host country imposed on
S.28 The indirect foreign tax credit mechanism essentially disregards
the separate legal existence of S. P is treated as if it had (1) earned
the before-foreign-tax earnings out of which S paid the dividend, and
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FxscAL YEAR 1993, H.RL Doc. No. 178 (Part Two),
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1992).
25 I.RC. § 7701(a) (1), (5) (West Supp. 1993).
26 By imposing a withholding tax on intercorporate dividends, the host country sub-
jects S's earnings to taxation twice at the corporate level. It is difficult tojustify this double
taxation on policy grounds. See Peter L Merrill et al., Tax Treaties in a GlobalEconomy: The
Case for Zero Withholding on Direct Dividends, 5 TAx No-ms INT'L 1387 (1992).
27 I.R.C. § 901 (West Supp. 1993) ("direct" foreign tax credit); I.R.C. § 902 (West
Supp. 1993) ("indirect" or "deemed paid" foreign tax credit).
28 This treatment is an exception to the general view that a U.S. parent corporation
and its foreign subsidiary are separate entities for tax purposes. A U.S. corporation may
claim an indirect foreign tax credit for a portion of the foreign income taxes paid by a
foreign corporation from which it receives a dividend, provided that the U.S. corporation
owns at least 10 percent of the voting stock of the foreign corporation. .RLC. § 902 (West
Supp. 1993).
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(2) paid the foreign income tax that S paid with respect to those earn-
ings.29 The United States will not, however, forgo its right to tax U.S.
source income. Thus, the foreign tax credit is limited to the tax-
payer's average before-credit U.S. tax rate times the amount of the
taxpayer's foreign source income.30
A mirror-image analysis applies to the taxation of foreign-based
multinationals with U.S. subsidiaries. The United States will treat the
U.S. subsidiary as a "United States person"31 and will impose the U.S.
corporate income tax on the subsidiary's income. The United States
also generally will impose source-based withholding taxes on the divi-
dends, interest, royalties, and similar payments that the U.S. subsidiary
makes to the foreign parent corporation.3 2
29 To illustrate these rules, suppose that the United States imposes a corporate in-
come tax on P at a rate of 35 percent; that the host country imposes a corporate income
tax on S at a rate of 20 percent; and that the host country imposes a withholding tax on
dividends at a rate of 10 percent. Suppose further that S earns $100 in the host country.
(Assume for simplicity that the host country's definition of taxable income is the same as
the U.S. definition of "earnings and profits.") S will owe $20 under the host country's
corporate income tax. If S distributes the remaining $80 to Pas a dividend, Pwill owe $8
in withholding tax to the host country, which the host country will collect from S. In
addition, the U.S. indirect foreign tax credit provision treats P as having earned $100 of
income (the $80 dividend, "grossed up" by the $20 of the host country corporate income
tax paid by S, to equal the $100 of before-foreign-tax earnings out of which the dividend
was paid) and deems P to have paid the $20 of the host country corporate income tax
actually paid by S. At the assumed tax rate of 35 percent, P will owe $35 in U.S. tax with
respect to this income. However, Pwill be entitled to a direct foreign tax credit of $8 and
an indirect foreign tax credit of $20, totalling $28. After claiming this credit, Pwill owe $7
in U.S. corporate income tax. The net result is that S's $100 of earnings will bear global
corporate income taxes of $35: $28 paid to the host country and $7 paid to the United
States. This is identical to the global corporate income tax liability that would have re-
sulted if P had simply earned $100 of income in the United States. In effect, the United
States has foregone its claim to tax the underlying foreign source income to the extent
($28) that the host country has taxed that income.
30 I.R.C. § 904(a) (West Supp. 1993). The limitation is expressed by the following
formula:
U.S. income tax liability on worldwide taxable income before foreign tax credit
Worldwide taxable income
x Total foreign source taxable income from all foreign countries
Foreign source taxable income consists of foreign source gross income less expenses
allocated and apportioned to foreign source gross income. See I.R.C. §§ 861-865 (West
Supp. 1993), as amended by Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§§ 13234, 13239.
The foreign tax credit limitation is actually calculated and applied separately with re-
spect to several categories or "baskets" of foreign source taxable income. I.R.C. § 904(d)
(West Supp. 1993), as amended by Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13235. This system is designed to prevent foreign taxes paid on a category of highly
taxed income (such as active business income) from being "cross-credited" against the
residual U.S. tax otherwise due on a different category of lightly taxed income (such as
passive investment income). See 1986 BLuE BooK, supra note 3, at 861-62.
31 I.R.C. § 7701 (a) (30) (West Supp. 1993).
32 I.R.C. § 881 (West Supp. 1993), as amended by Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13237.
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The multinational's home country could adopt any of a number
of approaches to the taxation of the U.S. subsidiary's earnings. The
home country could adopt a worldwide system of taxation, similar to
the one employed by the United States, and tax the parent corpora-
tion on the subsidiary's earnings upon repatriation, with an allowance
for a limited foreign tax credit. Alternatively, the home country could
adopt a territorial system and exempt the subsidiary's earnings from
corporate-level taxation when repatriated. The tax treatment of the
ultimate individual shareholders will depend on whether the home
country has integrated its corporate and individual income tax systems
and, if so, on whether it treats foreign corporate income taxes like
domestic corporate income taxes for integration purposes.33
The international corporate income tax system described above is
based on "separate accounting," with each affiliate of a multinational
treated as a separate taxpaying "person" and taxed on its income as
determined from its separate accounts. Tax agencies will intervene to
adjust these accounts, however, if they determine that the affiliate en-
gaged in transactions with other affiliates that do not conform to the
arm's length standard.3 4
The rule that corporations are separate taxpaying "persons" ob-
scures the extent to which the current international tax system, and
the arm's length standard in particular, implement the source princi-
ple rather than the residence principle. For example, when the
United States imposes its corporate income tax on the U.S. subsidiary
of a foreign-based multinational, it treats the subsidiary as a domestic
resident (i.e., a "United States person"). The United States then nom-
inally uses the arm's length standard to allocate income between this
resident taxpayer and nonresident taxpayers (the foreign affiliates of
the multinational) in order to measure properly the resident tax-
payer's income. Thus, the United States appears to use the arm's
length standard to implement residence-based, rather than source-
based, taxation.
33 Under a classical corporate income tax system, such as that in the United States,
corporate earnings are taxed at the corporate level when earned and again at the individ-
ual shareholder level when the corporation distributes the after-tax earnings as dividends.
The corporation is not allowed a deduction for the dividends paid, and the individual
shareholders are not allowed a credit for the corporate taxes paid on the underlying
earnings.
In an integrated income tax system, the corporate and individual income tax systems
are coordinated so that corporate income is taxed only once. For a brief description of the
integration systems in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom, see U.S. DEP'T OF THE TRFASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPO-
RATE TAX SYSTEMs: TAXING BusrNEss INCOME ONCE 159-84 (1992) [hereinafter TREASURY
INTEGRATION REPORT].
34 See supra note 7 (discussing status of arm's length standard as nominal interna-
tional norm).
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In this case, the United States could be viewed instead as exercis-
ing source-based jurisdiction over the multinational itself, because the
affiliates of a multinational are under common ownership and con-
trol, and operate as an economic unit.35 Even this analysis, however,
treats the multinational as a taxpaying "person" that is a resident of
the country in which the multinational is "based." This treatment is
inconsistent with the view that corporations cannot bear the burden
of taxes; the corporate tax, like all other taxes, is ultimately paid with a
reduction in the real income of natural persons.36 Under this view,
the principal justification for the corporate income tax is that it serves
as a withholding tax on individual shareholders, ensuring that those
shareholders cannot indefinitely defer or evade paying personal in-
come tax on the income they earn in corporate solution.3
7
If one takes this view of the corporate income tax, then the
United States' tax on the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign-based multina-
tional should be viewed as taxing, or at least as attempting to tax,38 the
ultimate individual shareholders of the multinational. Assuming that
35 Indeed, if the multinational operated through a U.S. branch rather than through a
U.S. subsidiary, the U.S. tax system would formally treat the multinational as a single non-
resident taxpayer earning U.S. source income, and the arm's length standard would be
used explicitly to allocate a portion of the multinational's income to the United States as
the source country. The fact that a U.S. corporate charter is interposed between the U.S.
source income and the nonresident taxpayer should not be seen as altering the substance
of the arrangement, unless one takes the implausible view that the corporate income tax is
a tax on the privilege of being granted a corporate charter. SeeJOSEPH E. STIGLrrz, Eco-
NOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 586 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that most economists cannot see
any strong argument for imposing a tax on the corporate form of organization, i.e., on
limited liability); DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 103 (1986) (noting
that "it is hard to construct a connection between the benefits of limited liability and any-
thing like the system of corporate income taxation"); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B.
MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE rN THEORY AND PRACTICE 373-74 (5th ed. 1989) (noting that a
tax on the privilege of limited liability cannot be justified on benefits grounds because the
institution of limited liability is practically costless to society).
36 See STGLrrz, supra note 35, at 586. The opposing view is that the large, widely-held
corporation is a separate legal entity that exercises great economic power in its own right,
without significant shareholder control, and therefore appropriately should be the subject
of separate taxation. See Alan Gunn, The Casefor an Income Tax, 46 U. CHn. L. REv. 370, 394-
96 (1979); MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 35, at 372-73 (criticizing this view).
37 See STIGL=FZ, supra note 35, at 586-87; MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 35, at 372.
This rationale is most persuasive in systems where the corporate and individual tax systems
are integrated. See supra note 33. The classical corporate income tax is difficult to rational-
ize if one takes the view that corporations cannot bear the burden of taxes. See STiGLrrz,
supra note 35, at 586-88.
38 Economists disagree about who bears the burden of the corporate income tax-its
"incidence." See generally TREASURY INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 33, at 146-47 (summa-
rizing major views); STIGIrZ, supra note 35, at 564-571 (same). In imposing the corporate
income tax, Congress presumably intends for it to be borne by shareholders; if it is shifted
to consumers or workers, it is an irrational means of imposing a tax on sales or wages. See
MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 35, at 373 & n.3. An alternative explanation, however,
is that Congress finds this tax attractive precisely because it is not clear who bears its bur-
den. See infra note 220.
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these individual shareholders are nonresidents of the United States,
the tax is an exercise by the United States of source-based jurisdiction
over nonresident individuals. Thus, the arm's length standard, as ap-
plied internationally, allocates the income that individuals earn from
transnational business among the countries of source.
The view that a country is justified in imposing a source-based
income tax on nonresidents is so universally accepted that it might
seem self-evident. Yet this principle of source entitlement is at odds
with the prevailing theory of the income tax. This theory justifies the
income tax as a means of allocating the cost of government among
taxpayers on the basis of their ability to pay.39 The theory maintains
that ability to pay is best measured by total income, comprehensively
defined and determined without regard to source. 40 Because it is gen-
erally assumed that ability to pay rises more than proportionally with
income, this leads to the conclusion that the income tax should be
progressive.41 Source-based income taxation is incompatible with this
underlying theory.42 The source country taxes only a fraction of a
taxpayer's total worldwide income, thus violating the ability-to-pay
principle. In addition, the source country does not base the rate of
tax on the taxpayer's total income, thus violating the progressivity
principle. Indeed, the source country generally does not even at-
tempt to determine the taxpayer's total income.
One might attempt to justify the source principle by using a bene-
fits theory of taxation. 43 Under this theory, the host country is enti-
tled to impose a tax on nonresidents to cover the costs they impose on
the public sector, including the cost of the public goods and services
that they use, and the external costs, such as the costs of pollution,
that their activities impose on residents. The problem with this ration-
ale is that the income tax in general, and the corporate income tax in
particular, cannot plausibly be viewed as a form of benefit fee or efflu-
ent charge.44 There is no definite relationship between a corpora-
39 SeeJoseph A. Pechman, The Future of the Income Tax, 80 AM. ECON. Rxv. 1, 6 (1990).
40 Id.
41 Id See generally W r= J. BLuM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., TM UNEASY CASE FOR PRO-
GRESSWVE TAXATION (1953) (analyzing the arguments for and against progressivity).
42 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRnrrs FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 99 (1977)
[hereinafter BLUE1'Rnrs FOR BASIC TAx REFORM]. The definition of "income" most widely
accepted by tax analysts-the Haig-Simons definition-is incompatible with the concept of
source; under this definition, income is determined by consumption and wealth accumula-
tion, which do not have any well-defined locational aspect. See Hugh J. Ault & David F.
Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises,
in TAXATION iN TrE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11, 30-31 (Assaf Razin &Joel Slemrod eds., 1990).
43 See generally MuscRAWv & MUSGRAvE, supra note 35, at 373-74 (discussing the argu-
ment that the corporate income tax can be justified as a benefits tax).
44 See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxation for Income
Taxes as the International Norm, 45 NAT'L TAXJ. 145, 149 (1992). Note that for purposes of
the U.S. foreign tax credit, a foreign levy is not considered to be a tax at all if the levy is
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tion's taxable income and the costs that the corporation imposes on
the public sector.45 In particular, a corporation's income depends sig-
nificantly on the outcomes of the business risks that the corporation
undertakes, whereas the costs the corporation imposes on the host
country are generally independent of those outcomes. Moreover, for-
eign direct investment often provides substantial benefits to the host
country, independently of any tax revenue. 46 It is likely that these
benefits sometimes exceed the costs that the corporate taxpayer im-
poses on the host government. This is why developing countries are
often willing to offer tax holidays to attract foreign direct investment.
Under a benefits theory of taxation, the government should subsidize,
rather than tax, this investment. Finally, if the income tax generally
(and the corporate income tax in particular) were a form of benefit
fee, it could not serve as a means of redistributing income. Yet the
suitability of the income tax for this purpose is one of the principal
justifications for adopting the income tax over other forms of
taxation.
An alternative version of the benefits justification for source-
based taxation might be that multinationals are sometimes able to
earn pure economic profits ("rents") by taking advantage of some spe-
cific feature of a country.47 A multinational might, for example, en-
gage in business in a developing country to gain access to its natural
resources, or it might engage in business in a developed country to
gain access to its large market of affluent consumers. In either situa-
tion, the multinational earns a higher before-tax rate of return on its
investment than it could have earned elsewhere. Arguably, the host
country should be entitled to tax the multinational on these location-
specific rents.48 Moreover, raising revenue by taxing these rents is effi-
cient, because the tax will not distort the taxpayer's economic
decisions.
Although the argument outlined above might justify source-based
taxation of location-specific rents, it does not justify a source-based
corporate income tax. The corporate income tax does not distinguish
between location-specific rents and the normal return on equity capi-
tal or rents that are specific to the multinational rather than to the
exchanged for a specific economic benefit. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2 (a) (2) (i) (as amended in
1991) (definition of "tax").
45 See MUsGwAVE & MusmRAvE, supra note 35, at 373-74.
46 See EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DmxcT INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 57-59 (2d ed. 1991). These benefits include the facilitation of trade in
goods, services and knowledge, the introduction of new technology, and the training of
workers. Id.
47 See McLure, supra note 44, at 148 (arguing that the source principle is bestjustified
as an entitlement to tax economic rents).
48 See id. at 14P-49.
[Vol. 79:18
SOURCE-BASED TAXATION
country. For example, a multinational might be able to obtain rents
because of its ownership of unique manufacturing knowledge, which
it can exploit by building a factory anywhere in the world. It is not
clear why the country that the multinational happens to choose as the
location for the factory should have a special entitlement to tax the
normal return on the investment in the factory49 or even the firm-
specific rents derived from the factory. Moreover, if the source coun-
try does tax such normal returns or firm-specific rents, the practical
effect will be to discourage multinationals from investing in the
country.
Another possible justification for source-based corporate income
taxation is that it serves as a means for the source country to regulate
the corporate activity that takes place within its borders.50 For exam-
ple, a country might wish to use taxation as an instrument to provide
incentives or disincentives for corporate investment or saving, to re-
strict monopoly power or the absolute size of firms, or to constrain
profits in connection with the imposition of direct controls over wages
and prices.51 Although taxation can be a useful device for accom-
plishing these purposes, the corporate income tax generally would
not be the most suitable form of taxation to employ if these were truly
the objectives of the tax.52
Although the best explanation for source-based taxation might
simply be that governments have power to impose such taxes, 53 there
is one pragmatic justification for the source principle that goes be-
yond force majeure. The country of source is generally in the best posi-
tion to enforce a tax on transnational income. The source country
can monitor this income by requiring local firms and financial in-
termediaries to report the income payments they make and to with-
hold taxes on such payments. The residence country, by contrast, has
49 See id. at 149 (arguing that the residence country rather than the source country
should be entitled to tax the normal return to capital, because the residence country has
generated the saving and investment on which that return is earned. Moreover, even apart
from taxation, the host country benefits from the increased productivity for its own re-
sources that the foreign-owned capital brings).
50 See generally MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 35, at 374-75 (discussing the argu-
ment that the corporate income tax can be justified as "an instrument of control over
corporate behavior.").
51 See id.
52 See id.
53 See A.R. Albrecht, The Taxation of Aliens Under International Law, 29 BRrr. Y.B. OF
INT'L L. 145, 148-49 (1952) (stating that the "right to tax aliens... isjustified in interna-
tional law essentially as an attribute of... sovereignty" rather than on the basis of coitrac-
tual or ethical principles); Ault & Bradford, supra note 42, at 32 (speculating that
acceptance of the primacy of source jurisdiction is based largely on force majeure); Richard
M. Bird, Shaping a New International Tax Order, 42 BULL. FOR INT'L FIscAL DOCUMENTATION
292, 294 (1988) (suggesting that the reason for the primacy of source jurisdiction is "the
simple reality that the source country will in any case inevitably get first crack at any
profits").
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no jurisdiction over such foreign entities, and must rely on less effec-
tive means to ensure compliance. Residence countries will typically
have to rely on their own investigations and on the cooperation of the
host country's tax agency.
In conclusion, it is difficult to find a persuasive underlying justifi-
cation for the host country's assertion of entitlement to tax the domes-
tic source income earned by foreign persons. 54 Instead of imposing a
limited income tax on foreigners, nations arguably should tax them
on the basis of the costs that their activities impose on the public sec-
tor, or on the basis of the location-specific rents that they earn by en-
gaging in activities within the country. The comprehensive income
tax would then be used exclusively as a means of taxing residents.
This approach, however, must overcome the enforcement problems
that arise in taxing foreign source income.
II
TRANSFER PRICE MANIPULATION
A source-based system of corporate income taxation requires a
method for allocating a multinational's income according to its
source country. The current international tax system relies on the
arm's length standard for this purpose.55 This section takes a closer
look at how multinationals can use transfer price manipulation to
minimize their global income tax liability. Additionally, this section
asks whether the arm's length principle provides a satisfactory means
for tax agencies to combat this manipulation.
A. Global Tax Minimization Using Transfer Pricing
Because of the complexity of the international tax system, mul-
tinationals must consider a variety of factors if they wish to set transfer
prices that will minimize their global tax burdens.
As an initial matter, changes in transfer prices will shift reported
taxable income from one affiliate to another. Consider again the ex-
ample of a U.S.-based multinational consisting of a U.S. corporation,
54 Apart from the question of entitlement, there is an argument for an international
system of purely source-based corporate income taxation on the ground that it would pro-
mote global economic efficiency. In particular, such a system would be neutral with re-
spect to the international allocation of world savings and ownership of capital. See
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TAXING PROFITS IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY-. DoMESTIc AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 39-42 (1991); Thomas Horst, A
Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income, 94 Q.J. ECON. 793 (1980).
Although the issue remains controversial, most analysts have concluded that greater bene-
fits would be produced by a system, such as purely residence-based taxation, that was neu-
tral with respect to the international allocation of world investment. ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 42.
55 For an explanation of the arm's length standard, see supra note 7.
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P, with a foreign subsidiary, S, and no other foreign operations. Sup-
pose P sells inventory to S, and S resells the inventory to customers in
the host country. Suppose further that there is a "correct" transfer
price, but that P can charge more (or less) without being challenged
by the tax agency of either country. If P decreases the transfer price,
the result will be to decrease P's reported taxable income (by decreas-
ing gross sales) and to increase S's reported taxable income by an
equal amount (by decreasing the cost of goods sold). If P and S are
subject to different corporate income tax rates, the shift of income
will alter the multinational's global tax burden.
Second, changes in transfer prices can affect a firm's foreign tax
credit limitation.56 If P decreases the transfer price, the result in
many cases will be to decrease the amount of P's foreign source taxa-
ble income.57 This, in turn, will decrease P's foreign tax credit
limitation.
Third, changes in transfer prices shift the location of funds. If P
decreases the transfer price, the result will be to shift funds from P to
S. When P repatriates the shifted funds, both the United States and
the host country generally will impose additional taxes on the income.
Finally, changes in transfer prices for payments such as interest,
royalties, rents, and management fees can affect the multinational's
liability for withholding taxes imposed on such payments.
It is useful to isolate the effects of deferral58 and cross-crediting,
two features of the current U.S. tax system, on a U.S.-based multina-
tional's transfer pricing strategy. Cross-crediting occurs because the
foreign tax credit limitation is calculated on an "overall" or worldwide
56 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
57 Under the Code's source-of-income rules, if P purchases the inventory in the
United States and sells it with title passing to S outside of the United States, the gross
income from the sale will be foreign source income. I.R.C. § 862(a) (6) (West Supp. 1993).
If P manufactures the inventory in the United States and sells it with title passing to S
outside of the United States, the gross income will be part U.S. source and part foreign
source. IRL § 863(b) (2). In either case, a decrease in the transfer price will decrease P's
foreign source gross income.
The shift of income from P to S might further decrease the amount of P's foreign
source taxable income by increasing the extent to which P's interest expense, if any, is
allocated and apportioned to foreign source gross income. Interest expense is allocated
and apportioned between U.S. source and foreign source gross income on the basis of
assets. I.R-C. § 864(e) (2) (West Supp. 1993). For this purpose, assets may be valued either
at fair market value or at tax book value. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(g) (1) (ii) (as amended in
1989). In the latter case, the value of the stock of a foreign subsidiary must be increased by
the amount of the subsidiary's undistributed earnings and profits. I.R.C. § 864(e) (4) (A)
(West Supp. 1993). If income is shifted to a foreign subsidiary, it will increase its earnings
and profits; if these earnings and profits are not repatriated currently as dividends, the
undistributed earnings and profits will cause additional interest expense at the U.S.-parent
level to be allocated and apportioned to foreign source gross income.
58 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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basis, rather than on a per country basis.5 9 Returning to the earlier
example, suppose that the host country imposes a corporate income
tax at a lower rate than the United States. If P decreases the transfer
price for the inventory, the initial effect will be to reduce the multina-
tional's global tax liability. The shifted income will be taxed at the low
foreign rate rather than at the high U.S. rate. Suppose that S repatri-
ates its earnings currently. When the shifted income (less the foreign
corporate income tax) is repatriated as a dividend, the host country
will impose a withholding tax on the dividend. Additionally, under
the direct and indirect foreign tax credit mechanisms, 60 the United
States will tax P on the shifted income, subject to a credit for the for-
eign taxes. This residual U.S. taxation will eliminate completely any
initial tax benefit that the multinational obtained by shifting the in-
come to S.61
Suppose, however, that S retains its earnings for some period of
time. Although the United States will impose residual taxation when
the shifted income is eventually repatriated, 62 the multinational will
have the benefit of the initial tax savings in the interim. This benefit
is equivalent to an interest-free loan from the U.S. Treasury in the
amount of the residual U.S. tax liability.63 Thus, the deferral principle
of U.S. taxation creates an incentive for U.S.-based multinationals to
shift income to subsidiaries in low-tax countries. 64
Conversely, if the United States has a lower corporate income tax
rate than the host country, the multinational will have an incentive to
increase the transfer price, thus reducing S's income and increasing
P's income. This increase in the transfer price will reduce the mul-
tinational's global corporate income tax liability. In addition, it will
reduce the earnings that S has available to repatriate as dividends, and
thus will reduce the multinational's liability for the host country's
withholding taxes on dividends.
59 See supra note 30.
60 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
61 See supra note 29. Indeed, if the total amount of the host country tax (corporate
income tax plus withholding tax) imposed on the shifted income exceeds the U.S. corpo-
rate income tax that would have been imposed on the income if it had not been shifted,
there will be a tax detriment from shifting the income.
62 In addition, the host country generally will impose a withholding tax on the
dividend.
63 In the case of a foreign corporation that qualifies as a "passive foreign investment
company" (PFIC), the Code recognizes this equivalence and imposes an interest charge on
the deferred U.S. taxes, unless the U.S. shareholder elects to be taxed currently on the
PFIC's income. I.R.C. §§ 1291-1297 (West Supp. 1993), as amended by Revenue Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13231.
64 This assumes that there are attractive investment opportunities in the host country
or that S can transfer its earnings to other affiliates of the multinational with better invest-
ment opportunities without triggering U.S. taxation or significant additional foreign
taxation.
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This analysis assumes that P has no foreign operations other than
those it conducts through S. Suppose instead that P has a number of
other foreign operations, all of which generate foreign source income
that is subject to foreign taxation. If P's foreign operations are con-
centrated in countries with higher effective corporate income tax
rates than the United States, P is likely to be in a position where the
amount of foreign taxes that it pays (or is deemed to pay) exceeds its
foreign tax credit limitation.65 If P is in such an "excess credit" posi-
tion,66 any additional foreign source income it earns will be subject
only to foreign taxes.
Thus, if P is in an excess credit position, it will have a tax incen-
tive to invest in low-tax foreign countries, even without regard to
deferral. Pwill also have a tax incentive to use transfer pricing to shift
income from its foreign subsidiaries, provided that the shifted income
is characterized as foreign source income to P and that the foreign
country does not impose high withholding taxes on the intercompany
payments used to shift the income. In the earlier example, suppose P
increases the transfer price for the sale of inventory to S by $100. As-
suming that the gross income from the sale is foreign source income
to p67 and that P is subject to U.S. corporate income tax at a 35-per-
cent rate, this increase in the transfer price will increase P's before-
credit U.S. tax liability by $35, but also will increase P's foreign tax
credit limitation by $35. This increased limitation will enable P to use
$35 of its excess credits, completely offsetting the increase in P's
before-credit U.S. tax liability. This operation is termed "cross-credit-
ing." P is crediting "excess" foreign taxes paid with respect to other
foreign source income against U.S. tax liability attributable to income
from the host country. As a result of this cross-crediting, the increase
65 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
66 After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the effective U.S. corporate income tax rate is
generally lower than foreign rates; thus, it is common for U.S. corporations to be in excess
credit positions. See Ault & Bradford, supra note 42, at 16. The 1986 Act further increased
the likelihood of U.S. corporations being in excess credit positions by reducing the extent
to which gross income can be characterized as foreign source, increasing the extent to
which expenses must be allocated and apportioned to foreign source gross income, and
increasing the number of separate foreign tax credit limitation baskets. See, e.g., Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 1201 (separate foreign tax credit limitation bas-
kets), 1211 (source of gross income from sales of personal property), 1215 (allocation and
apportionment of interest expense), 100 Stat. 2085, 2520-28, 2533-86, 2544-48 (1986).
A taxpayer may carry excess foreign tax credits back two years and forward five years to
offset U.S. tax liability for those years, but only to the extent that there is "excess limita-
tion" available; that is, to the extent that foreign taxes on foreign income in those years are
less than the U.S. tax. I.R.C. § 904(c) (West Supp. 1993). However, if a taxpayer is chroni-
cally in an excess credit position, it will not be able to use its excess credits. Moreover,
credits carried forward lose their value, since there is no interest adjustment.
67 See supra note 57.
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in the transfer price will reduce global taxes by $100tf, where tf is the
host country's corporate income tax rate.
Similarly, if P is in an excess credit position, it will have an incen-
tive to maximize the transfer prices for deductible intercompany pay-
ments (such as interest, royalties, rents, or management fees) from its
foreign subsidiaries, provided that the payments are foreign source
income to P and the foreign country's withholding tax rate applicable
to the payment is less than its corporate income tax rate.68
A mirror-image analysis applies to foreign-based multinationals
with U.S. subsidiaries, assuming that the home country, like the
United States, taxes its residents on their worldwide income and al-
lows a foreign tax credit with a worldwide limitation. If the home
country uses a territorial system, in which foreign source active busi-
ness income and dividends paid by foreign subsidiaries are exempt
from taxation, then the foreign-based multinational will generally
have an incentive to shift income to the country with the lower statu-
tory corporate income tax rate. A foreign country might also give its
multinationals an incentive to shift income to the parent corporation
by integrating its corporate and individual income tax systems using
an imputation system that grants imputation credits for domestic tax
payments but not for foreign tax payments. 69
In summary, multinationals often have an incentive to shift in-
come from affiliates in countries with high corporate income tax rates
to affiliates in countries with low corporate income tax rates. Even in
cases where a multinational has an incentive to shift income from a
low-tax country to a high-tax country (perhaps because the parent cor-
poration is in an excess credit position, or because of the home coun-
try's system of integration), the incentive to shift will decrease as the
low-tax country's corporate income tax rate falls.
B. Rationales for the Arm's Length Standard
To control the possibilities for manipulation described above, tax
agencies are generally authorized to reallocate income by adjusting
transfer prices that are deemed to be artificial. It is highly desirable
that tax agencies employ for this purpose a method that is internation-
ally accepted. If different countries use different allocation methods,
international under-taxation or over-taxation of income is inevitable.
68 See infra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing tax minimization strategies
using interest payments on intercompany loans).
69 See HughJ. Ault, Corporate Integration and Tax Treaties: Where Do We Gofrom Here?, 4
TAX NoTs INT'L 545, 546 (1992). In an imputation system, an individual shareholder who
receives a dividend from a corporation must "gross up" the dividend by the amount of
corporate income tax attributable to the earnings out of which the dividend is paid, in-
clude the grossed-up dividend in income, and claim an "imputation credit" for the attrib-
uted corporate income tax.
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That is, portions of a multinational's income will either remain un-
taxed or be subjected, without relief, to the taxes of more than one
country. The same result will likely occur if countries agree in princi-
ple on a method that is indeterminate in practice.
Proponents of the arm's length standard, including the U.S.
Treasury, defend it on the ground that it has achieved international
acceptance and is, or can be made to be, a reasonably objective, deter-
minate standard. In addition, they argue that the arm's length stan-
dard is desirable because it does not distort a firm's decisions about
whether to affiliate with other firms and because it accurately allocates
income to firms or locations based on where economic activity occurs.
1. International Acceptance and Determinacy of the Arm's Length
Standard
As the German government noted in expressing reservations to a
recent report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD), "the consensus regarding the actual application
of the 'arm's length principle' is extremely vague and precarious."70
Under the arm's length standard, a tax agency may adjust the price
charged in a transaction between commonly controlled firms to con-
form to the price that would have been charged had the same transac-
tion occurred between unrelated parties.71 The only objective way to
determine such a price is to find unrelated firms that in fact engage in
the same transaction under the same circumstances as the commonly
controlled firms. This is seldom possible. A more generally applica-
ble but less objective approach is to find unrelated firms that engage
in similar, though not identical, transactions under similar circum-
stances, and to adjust the uncontrolled price to compensate for any
differences. These approaches are collectively known as the "compa-
rable uncontrolled price" method.7 2
It has long been recognized, however, that suitable comparable
uncontrolled transactions are often impossible to find.73 Integrated
70 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, IssuES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TAXATION No. 2, THIN CAPITALiSATION AND TAXATION OF ENTERTAINERS, ARTISTES
AND SPORTSMEN 36 (1987) [hereinafter OECD THIN CAPITALISATION REPORT].
71 See supra note 7.
72 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRANSFER PRIG-
ING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPISES 11, at 13 (1979) [hereinafter OECD TRANSFER PRIC.
ING REPORT]; see, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2A(d) (2) (ii) (as amended in 1993) (transfers of
intangible property); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4T(c) (1993) (same); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
2A(e) (2) (as amended in 1993) (transfers of tangible property); Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-3T(b) (1993) (same).
73 See WHITE PA ER, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that comparable uncontrolled trans-
fers of intangible property are often unavailable); id. at 21-22 (referring to studies showing
that the IRS usually resorts to methods other than the comparable uncontrolled price
method to adjust transfer prices for tangible property); OECD TRANSFER PRICING REPORT,
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multinationals often come into existence in situations where market
transactions between unrelated parties would be so inefficient that
they do not occur. In particular, transfers of intangible property, such
as patents, trademarks, and know-how, among the affiliates of a mul-
tinational often have no market counterparts.
When comparable uncontrolled transactions do not exist, the al-
ternative is to use a theoretical model to determine what unrelated
firms would have charged had they engaged in the same transaction
as the related firms. The pre-1993 Treasury regulations under Section
482 did not provide any generally applicable approach to answering
this hypothetical question. 74 In particular, with respect to transfers of
intangible property, the regulations merely provided a list of general
factors to be considered, with no suggestion of how the factors should
be weighted.75
One difficulty in developing a theoretical approach is that a
highly simplified-indeed, oversimplified-underlying theory must be
used to arrive at an administrable methodology.76 A second difficulty
emerges because unrelated firms dealing at arm's length often deter-
mine prices on the basis of expectations.77 In the case of transfers of
intangible property, the transferee generally will use the property over
a period of time as part of a productive process, and therefore will
value the property based on projections of how much it will contrib-
ute to future earnings. Any approach to determining arm's length
prices that is not based on expectations at the time of the transfer will
supra note 72, 11, at 13. In a report issued in 1981, the U.S. General Accounting Office
found that the IRS used the comparable uncontrolled price method in only 15 percent of
its total recommended § 482 adjustments relating to transfers of tangible property (repre-
senting 2 percent of total dollar value), while it used ad hoc methods in 47 percent of all
adjustments (representing 86 percent of total dollar value). U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFCE, IRS CouLD BETrER PROTECT U.S. TAX INERSTS IN DETERMINING THE INCOME OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONs 31 (1981).
74 See WHrrE PAPER, supra note 1, at 35 (concluding that the pre-1993 regulations
failed "to provide guidance in the absence of comparable... transactions").
75 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2A(d) (2) (iii) (as amended in 1993).
76 For example, one might redefine the notion of an arm's length price as the price
that would provide the managers of decentralized units of a multinational enterprise with
the correct incentives to maximize the before-tax profits of the enterprise as a whole.
Given certain simplifying conditions, the transfer price for tangible property should then
be set equal to marginal cost. SeeJack Hirshleifer, On the Economics of TransferPricing, 29J.
Bus. 172 (1956); Ann D. Witte & Tasneem Chipty, Some Thoughts on TransferPricing, 49 TAX
NoTEs 1009, 1014 (1990). In practice, however, marginal cost information is rarely known
within a firm because it depends on opportunity costs; even if it were known, the IRS could
not be assured that the firm would truthfully reveal it. See Bengt Holmstrom &Jean Tirole,
Transfer Pricing and OrganizationalForm, 7J. L. ECON. & ORG. 201 (1991). Although regula-
tory economists have developed methods for estimating marginal costs, see Witte & Chipty,
supra, at 1018, firms and the IRS would likely find it extremely costly to apply these meth-
ods on a routine basis for determining transfer prices for tax purposes.
77 See Laurie J. Dicker & George N. Carlson, The Proposed Transfer Pricing Regulations:
Comments and Concerns, 45 NAT'L TAxJ. 235-36 (1992).
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be difficult to defend as being consistent with the arm's length princi-
ple. This will be particularly true if the approach is based on an over-
simplified theory. As a result, the approach is unlikely to achieve
international acceptance unless all countries agree to reinterpret the
arm's length principle. The alternative, an approach to determining
arm's length prices that is based on such expectations, will inevitably
be indeterminate and difficult to administer. Recent Treasury propos-
als 78 for implementing the arm's length principle have failed to re-
solve this dilemma.
Before turning to the Treasury proposals, it is instructive to con-
sider a formal approach to determining the arm's length price for a
transfer of intangible property on the basis of expectations. 79 This
approach would analyze the transfer pricing problem from the per-
spective of an independent investor contemplating a purchase of the
line of business in which the transferred intangible property is to be
used. Under a standard financial investment analysis, the investor
would determine whether to purchase the business by calculating its
net present value.8 0 To make this calculation, the investor would first
forecast the cash flows to be generated by the business over its eco-
nomic life, including negative amounts representing the projected
royalty payments for the transferred intangible property (assuming,
for the moment, that the royalty rate is known). The investor would
then determine the appropriate opportunity cost of capital for the
business, which would reflect both the time value of money and the
nondiversifiable risk involved in the business. The investor would
then use the opportunity cost of capital to discount the projected cash
flows of the business to present value. Finally, the investor would cal-
culate net present value by subtracting the required initial investment
78 WHrrE PAPER, supra note 1; Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1 to -2, 57 Fed. Reg. 3571
(1992), withdrawn by 1NTL401-88, 1993-10 I.R.B. 60; Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-0T to -5T
(1993).
79 For a more detailed discussion of this approach, see Daniel J. Frisch, The BALRM
Approach to Transfer Pring, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 261 (1989); see also A.R. Durando, Pdces on
Transfer of Intangible Property Between Related Taxpayers: Can the Section 482 White Paper's Arm's
Length Return Method Work?, 41 FLA. L. REv. 813 (1989); Edward A. Purnell, The Net Present
Value Approach to Intangible Transfer Pricing Under Section 482: An Economic Model Takes the
BALRMFlor, 45 TAX LAw. 647 (1992); Witte & Chipty, supra note 76, at 1021-23. The term
"BALRM" refers to the "Basic Arm's Length Return Method" proposed by the Treasury
Department in 1988. See WHrrE PAPER, supra note 1, at 94-99.
80 For a standard textbook discussion of this approach to investment decisionmaking,
see RicHARD A. BREAnv & STEWvART C. MYERs, PINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE pts. 1-3
(4th ed. 1991).
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from the present value of the business.8 ' The investor should invest in
the business if its net present value is positive.8 2
To use this approach in determining the arm's length royalty rate
for the transferred intangible property, one would treat the royalty
rate as a variable and determine the value for the royalty rate that
would equate net present value to zero. This solution would be the
highest royalty rate that an independent investor would be willing to
accept. Assuming perfect competition among potential investors, this
solution would yield the arm's length royalty rate.83
Despite its theoretical merits,8 4 this expectations-based approach
would be unsatisfactory in practice.8 5 It would require the taxpayer
and IRS to determine the fair market value of the business's existing
tangible and intangible assets as well as the opportunity cost of capital
for the business. In general, neither of these determinations is objec-
tive or determinate.8 6 More importantly, this approach would require
the taxpayer to make cash flow projections, and the IRS to audit those
projections. A taxpayer could manipulate the projections to justify
any desired transfer price, and it would be difficult for the IRS to es-
tablish that the projections were not bona fide.
81 The amount of the required initial investment would be equal to the fair market
value of the existing tangible and intangible property used in the business. In practice, it
might be extremely difficult to estimate this value unless the business (or a similar busi-
ness) had recently been purchased or unless all of the property used in the business were
readily marketable.
82 BaMALLs & MYERS, supra note 80, at 23-24.
83 An approach along these lines was used by the Tax Court in Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 525 (1989), affd, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991). In Bausch & Lomb,
the U.S. parent corporation established a subsidiary in Ireland to manufacture soft contact
lenses. The parent corporation transferred a unique manufacturing process to the subsidi-
ary in exchange for royalty payments, which the IRS contended did not represent an arm's
length price for the technology. The court in Bausch & Lomb determined an arm's length
royalty rate on the basis of cash flow projections that the parent corporation had prepared
for the purpose of determining the feasibility of the Irish manufacturing facility, and on
the basis of the court's estimate of the appropriate internal rate of return for the facility
given the riskiness of the venture. The court stated that it found little relevance in Bausch
& Lomb Ireland's actual results of operations, since those results would not have been
available to a potential licensee negotiating a license agreement.
84 Actually, the theoretical merits of the approach outlined above are debatable. The
standard method for determining the appropriate opportunity cost of capital is based on
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). See Frisch, supra note 79, at 265-66. This model is
not perfectly validated by empirical tests. See THOMAS E. COPELAND & J. FRED WESTON,
FINANciAL THEORY AND COR'ORATE PoLic" 212-17, 216 (3d ed. 1988) (concluding that "the
pure theoretical form of the CAPM does not agree well with reality.").
85 See Michael E. Granfield & Frances M. Homer, Putting Economic Models in Their Sec-
tion 482 Place: A Safe Harbor Approach, 49 TAx NOTES 561 (1990).
86 See BRALEY & MYERS, supra note 80, at 196-200 (explaining that determination of
the appropriate discount rate is generally a matter ofjudgment); Frisch, supra note 79, at
267 (noting that a discounted cash flow analysis "will always involve judgement [sic] and
uncertainty in its application").
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Congress and the Treasury have chosen not to rely on expecta-
tions-based approaches for determining arm's length prices. Con-
gress amended Section 482 in 1986 to make it clear that the IRS is not
bound to accept transfer prices based on profit expectations for intan-
gible property.8 7 This amendment requires the IRS to adjust transfer
prices if the actual income attributable to the intangible property
turns out to be greater than the projected income.88 Similarly, the
recent Treasury proposals for implementation of the arm's length
principle attempt to generate arm's length prices from actual profits
rather than from expected profits.8 9 In general terms, the Treasury's
approach involves comparing the reported profitability of one of the
parties to the controlled transaction (the "tested party")90 to the prof-
itability of operationally similar uncontrolled companies. 91 The com-
87 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1231(e) (1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2562-63
(amending I.R.C. § 482) (1986). This amendment added a new sentence at the end of
§ 482, which provides that "in the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property
.. the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with the
income attributable to the intangible." Id. The Joint Committee on Taxation's official
explanation of the Act states that Congress intended that the IRS should not limit itself to
considering whether the compensation for a transfer of intangible property was appropri-
ate in light of "the facts in existence at the time of the transfer." 1986 BLUE BooK, supra
note 3, at 1016. Instead, the IRS also should consider the actual profit experience realized
as a consequence of the transfer. Id. The legislative history indicates that Congress was
concerned that taxpayers could easily conceal from the IRS their true expectations of the
profit potential of the transferred intangible property. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. at 424 (1985).
88 See 1986 BLUE BooK, supra note 3, at 1016.
89 These proposed methods are the "arm's length return method" of the White Paper,
the "comparable profit method" of the regulations proposed in 1992, and the "comparable
profits method" of the temporary regulations issued in 1993. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 1, at
94-102; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d) (5), (e), (f), 57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (1992), withdrawn by
INTL-401-88, 1993-10 I.R.B. 60; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5T (1993). The proposed regu-
lations would have required the IRS to employ the comparable profit method in determin-
ing arm's length profits for all transfers of tangible or intangible property whenever the
comparable uncontrolled price method, narrowly interpreted, was inapplicable.
These methods are of use primarily to the IRS in auditing taxpayers. They are of little
use to taxpayers in setting transfer prices, because taxpayers must establish their transfer
prices before they have information about actual profits.
90 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5T(b) (1993).
91 More precisely, the White Paper, the proposed regulations, and the temporary regu-
lations contemplate that the IRS will apply this methodology to component functions or
operations of the tested party. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 1, at 107; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
2(f) (5), 57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (1992), withdrawn by INTL-01-88, 1993-10 I.R.B. 60; Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5T(b) (2) (1993). This means that the IRS must allocate joint costs and
assets among the various functions or operations of the tested party in order to determine
the profitability of the functions or operations in question. It is a well-established principle
of public utility regulation, however, that any such allocation is arbitrary, and that it is
meaningless to talk about the profitability of a portion of an integrated firm's activities. See
Witte & Chipty, supra note 76, at 1017; William J. Baumol et al., How Arbitrary Is "Arbi-
tray"?--or, Toward the Deserved Demise of Full Cost Allocation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 3, 1987,
at 16.
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parison entails calculating financial ratios 92 for the uncontrolled
companies and applying them to the financial data of the tested party
to reconstruct its income. 93 For example, the IRS might reconstruct
the income of a controlled company by finding an uncontrolled com-
pany with similar operations, calculating the uncontrolled company's
ratio of operating profit to operating assets, and multiplying this ratio
by the value of the controlled company's operating assets. 9 4 Once the
IRS reconstructs the income of the controlled company in this man-
ner, it can work backwards mathematically to determine the proper
transfer price adjustment.95
The Treasury's approach to determining arm's length prices is
based on an oversimplified economic theory and ignores the distinc-
tion between expected profits and actual profits. The approach as-
sumes that factors of production are homogeneous and mobile, and
that the market is competitive and in long-run equilibrium.96 These
assumptions are particularly unlikely to be satisfied in the often oligo-
polistic markets in which multinationals operate, which are generally
characterized by new innovation and occasional entry and exit of
firms rather than by long-run equilibrium.97
Even if one takes these assumptions as true, the conclusion that
follows is merely that two firms that assume equal risk will expect to
earn the same economic return on assets. The Treasury's approach
contemplates comparing a controlled firm's actual (or reported) ac-
92 Potentially applicable financial ratios, also referred to as "profit level indicators,"
include the rate of return on capital employed (i.e., the ratio of operating profit to operat-
ing assets), the ratio of operating profit to sales, and the ratio of gross profit to operating
expenses. SeeWHrrE PAPER, supra note 1, at 97-98; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(f) (6) (iii) (C),
57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (1992), withdrawn by INTI01-88, 1993-10 I.R.B. 60; Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-5T(e) (1993).
93 The White Paper contemplates that this "basic arm's length return method" will be
applied only when the tested party performs simple, low-risk economic functions using
measurable assets or other factors, but not using significant self-developed intangibles.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 107. In more complex cases where both of the related par-
ties perform complex economic functions, bear significant economic risks, and use signifi-
cant self-developed intangibles, the White Paper approach is to apply the "basic arm's
length return method," described above, to the measurable assets or other factors of each
of the parties, and then to split the residual consolidated income of the parties between
them based on the relative values of their unique intangibles. Id
94 The temporary regulations contemplate that the IRS might repeat this process us-
ing a number of uncontrolled companies, producing a range of reconstructed incomes for
the tested party. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5T(d) (1993). If the reported income of the
tested party falls within this "arm's length range," the IRS will not adjust the prices used
and the income reported by the related parties. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-IT(d) (2) (i)
(1993).
95 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-IT(d) (2) (i) (C) (1993).
96 WHrm PAPER, supra note 1, at 83.
97 Se ELHANAN HELPMAN & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, TRADE PoLIcy AND MARKET STRuCTURE
1 (1989); Michael E. Granfield, An Economist in the BALRM, 44 TAx NoTEs 217, 220-22
(1989).
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counting returns with the actual accounting returns of comparable
uncontrolled firms. Accounting returns, however, are not the same as
economic returns; even when calculated over long periods of time,
they generally diverge from economic returns in arbitrary and some-
times substantial ways.98
Moreover, when risk is present, actual returns are not the same as
expected returns. Expected returns reflect the probabilities that vari-
ous possible outcomes will occur in the future; actual returns reflect
outcomes that in fact occurred in the past. A multinational might set
transfer prices for transactions between two affiliates based on the rea-
sonable expectation that those prices will permit each affiliate to earn
normal profits. Yet, either or both affiliates might well end up report-
ing losses. Thus, the fact that a controlled firm earns a lower return
than a comparable uncontrolled firm does not necessarily mean that
it has manipulated transfer prices. It might only mean that the con-
trolled firm was adversely affected by the unique risks that it faced. As
a result, a low profitability index can be used, at most, as an indicator
that a firm might be manipulating transfer prices.
Given the possible disparity between actual and expected returns,
a firm should be entitled to show that its transfer prices were set on
the basis of reasonable expectations, and that its low profitability was
the result of adverse outcomes. Any such approach, however, would
dissolve into a subjective facts-and-circumstances analysis.
Because the Treasury's approach would often reject transfer
prices based on the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time
of the transfer, it will probably not gain international acceptance. The
OECD has recommended that the comparable profit method be used
primarily to complement or cross-check other methods of determin-
ing transfer prices and as a tool for selecting cases for audit. The
OECD has also recommended that the comparable profit method be
used only as a method of last resort for determining specific adjust-
ment amounts.99 The German Parliament has passed a resolution ex-
pressing its view that the comparable profit method is inconsistent
vith the arm's length principle. 100 Leading members of the Parlia-
98 For a discussion of the difference between economic and accounting rates of re-
turn, see BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 80, at 270-71; Franklin M. Fisher & John J. Mc-
Gowan, On the Misuse ofAccounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 AM. ECON. REv.
82 (1983).
99 Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment, The United States Proposed Regulations Dealing with Tax Aspects of Transfer Pricing
Within Multinational Enterprises (1993), reprinted in 6 TAx NOTES INT'L 93, 97 (1993).
100 RESOLUTION OF THE FnANcE CommrrrEE OF THE DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG (GERMAN
FEDERAL PARLIAMENT), ON THE DRAFT GUmELms OF THE U.S. REVENUE ADMImSTRATON
FOR Tm DETERMINATION AND REVIEW OF INTERNAL TRANSFER PRICES FOR GROUPS OF COMPA-
NiES, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File No. 92 TNT 150-108 (July 23, 1992)
(Annex).
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ment visited the United States to convey this view to the Treasury and
to Congress. 1° 1 Indeed, apart from the principle that comparable un-
controlled prices should be used if available, there appears to be little
international agreement on the content of the arm's length standard.
The Treasury's approach also fails to resolve the uncertainty in-
herent in finding arm's length prices for transfers that occur only be-
tween controlled parties. 10 2  The indeterminacy involved in
reconstructing arm's length prices under Section 482 will almost cer-
tainly increase over time. This is because in the past, the IRS has fo-
cused on transactions between U.S. parent companies and their
wholly-owned subsidiaries in tax haven countries.' 0 3 More recently,
the emphasis has shifted to transactions between foreign parent com-
panies and their U.S. affiliates, a trend which will probably con-
tinue.10 4 Because the interrelated operations are likely to be far more
complex, the difficulty in applying Section 482 is likely to be much
greater when the related companies are both located in developed
countries.
More generally, it is likely that transactions between related cor-
porations will become increasingly prevalent and more complex with
the growth of worldwide economic integration and intercompany
trade. As a result, there will be fewer uncontrolled transactions avail-
able to use as standards for comparison. Moreover, world trade in-
creasingly involves intermediate goods and high-technology products
whose manufacture and distribution involve intangible property.
Comparable uncontrolled transactions are particularly unlikely to be
available for these types of transfers. 10 5 Finally, as the number of in-
tercompany transactions grows, it will become increasingly difficult for
the IRS to examine more than a small proportion of such
transactions.10 6
101 This visit reportedly "represents the first time a German delegation has visited a
foreign country to discuss that country's domestic legislation." John Turro, German Officials
Fault U.S. Foreign Tax Bill and Proposed Transfer-Piking Regs, 5 TAx NOTEs INT'L 175 (1992).
102 See e.g., Alan W. Granwell & Kenneth Klein, "Objective" Tests of Transfer Picing Prop.
Regs. Require Subjective Determinations, 76J. TAx'N 308 (1992) (discussing the indeterminacy
of the methodology of the proposed regulations); Richard L. Kaplan, International Tax En-
forcement and the Special Challenge of Transfer Pricing, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 299, 318-21 (1990)
(discussing the indeterminacy of the methodology of the White Paper).
103 See WHrrE PAPER, supra note 1, at 14; GAO, INTERNATIONAL TAxATION, supra note 6,
at 26-29.
104 See Barbara L. Rollinson & Rom P. Watson, The New Intercompany PricingRegulations,
45 NAT'L TAxJ. 225, 226 (1992); WHIrE PAPER, supra note 1, at 15.
105 See GAO, INTERNATIoNAL TAXATION, supra note 6, at 63.
106 For example, it has been reported that 3M Corp. must compute transfer prices for
120,000 products. Lee Sheppard, Tax Foundation Hosts Conference on Transfer Pricing, 4 TAx
NoTES INT'L 1193, 1194 (1992). This problem can only be avoided by using methodologies
based on aggregate results rather than specific transactions.
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2. Neutrality Between Affiliated and Unaffiliated Firms
An independent rationale for using the arm's length standard to
allocate income among commonly controlled corporations is that it
neutralizes the tax incentive that a corporation otherwise might have
to affiliate with other corporations.10 7 Consider a domestic firm that
is contemplating engaging in business abroad. The firm could do so
either by creating or acquiring foreign affiliates, or by engaging in
market-based transactions with unrelated foreign firms. The two ap-
proaches involve different costs. For example, with the first approach
there are costs of exercising internal control over a multinational op-
eration and start-up costs associated with learning how to conduct
business in a foreign country. 08 Under the second approach there
are transaction costs, which can include the costs of negotiating, mon-
itoring, and enforcing long term contracts needed to protect the do-
mestic firm's intangible property rights and prevent the unrelated
trading partners from engaging in opportunistic behavior.10 9 Ideally,
the form of organization should be chosen on the basis of economic
costs, and should not be distorted by tax considerations. 10
Suppose, for example, that a manufacturing corporation, P, can
market its product overseas equally efficiently either by selling to an
unrelated foreign distributor, T, or by forming its own foreign distri-
bution subsidiary, S. If the tax rates in the home and host countries
are different, the tax liabilities incurred under each option will de-
pend on the transfer price. If P sells the product to T, the fact that P
and T have adverse interests in setting the price will generally ensure
that the price will not be tax motivated, at least as long as P and T
cannot make side payments that they can conceal from the tax author-
ities. If, however, P sells the product to S, central management could
direct the two commonly controlled firms to set the transfer price in
order to minimize their combined taxes. Thus tax considerations
could induce P to create or acquire a foreign distribution subsidiary
rather than to sell to unrelated foreign distributors. Indeed, even if
selling to unrelated foreign distributors were more efficient, the tax
savings might induce P to affiliate with its distributor. If it were possi-
ble to enforce a rule requiring P and S to use the same transfer price
107 See Charles H. Berry et al., Arm's-Length Pring: Some Economic Perspectives, 54 TAx
NOTES 731, 732 (1992); W-rrE PAPER, supra note 1, at 82. This rationale appears to be of
recent vintage.
108 See RmHARD E. CAvEs, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 12-13
(1982).
109 See idt at 16-18.
110 This statement does not take into account second-best considerations (the pres-
ence of some inefficiency elsewhere). The removal of one tax distortion will not necessar-
ily increase efficiency if there are other distortions in the system. See Berry et al., supra note
107, at 732 n.4.
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as Pand T (the arm's length price), the tax incentive to affiliate would
be eliminated.
This neutrality rationale provides a cogent reason for applying
the arm's length standard to those multinationals whose intercom-
pany transactions could be carried out with approximately equal (or
greater) efficiency by unrelated firms. As noted above, many multina-
tionals do not fall into this class, but instead come into being because
market transactions are not feasible. Nonetheless, it is possible that, if
the arm's length standard were replaced by a different methodology
for allocating income, inefficient multinationals would come into exis-
tence for tax-driven reasons.
3. Allocation of Income Based on Economic Activity
A final proffered rationale for using the arm's length standard is
that it accurately allocates income among affiliates of a multinational
in proportion to each affiliate's economic activity.'' A frequent ob-
jection to this rationale is that it ignores the industrial organization
theory of the multinational enterprise. According to this theory, the
profitability of a multinational enterprise is largely attributable to the
organizational form itself, which enables the multinational to reduce
transaction costs, achieve integration economies, and exploit intangi-
ble assets, which often cannot be localized. Consequently, all of the
income of a multinational cannot be allocated among its affiliates in
any principled manner.112
A more basic difficulty with the argument that the arm's length
standard is desirable because it accurately allocates income to source
is that this argument rests on the underlying premise that a source-
based tax on income isjustified. As discussed in Part I, this premise is
open to question.
III
FiNANcLAL, MANEUVERING
Congress and the Treasury have focused their attention predomi-
nantly on the use of artificial transfer pricing as a strategy for global
tax minimization. However, a multinational can achieve essentially
the same shifting of income through intercompany lending or the al-
111 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 79-80 (stating that the goal of the arm's length
standard is to ensure that an economic activity's return is allocated to the party that per-
forms it); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 281, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-637 (1986) (stating that the
1986 amendment to § 482 was intended to ensure that the division of income between
related parties reasonably reflects the economic activities of each).
112 See Stanley I. Langbein, Transaction Cost, Production Cost, and Tax Transfer Picing, 44
TAx NoTEs 1391, 1407-8 (1989); Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of
Arm's Length, 30 TAx NoTEs 625, 654-69 (1986); see also WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 80-82
(discussing this criticism of the arm's length standard).
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location of third-party debt among affiliates. Even if the Treasury
were to succeed in implementing the arm's length principle in a way
that would prevent transfer pricing, the victory would be hollow if
multinationals could continue to minimize taxes through financial
maneuvering.
A. Global Tax Minimization Using Financial Maneuvering
1. Intercompany Lending
Consider again the case of a U.S. corporation, P, with a foreign
subsidiary, S. If P lends funds to S rather than contributing the funds
to the capital of S, the return to P will take the form of interest pay-
ments. S will be entitled to a deduction for the interest payments and
therefore will avoid the host country's tax on the earnings out of
which the interest is paid. Moreover, the host country's withholding
tax on the interest payments will often be imposed at a lower rate than
its withholding tax on dividends. 113 Treaties often reduce the with-
holding tax rate on interest to zero, in which case no host country tax
will be imposed on the earnings out of which the interest is paid. The
United States will tax P on the interest payments received, subject to a
foreign tax credit for any withholding tax paid to the host country.
The interest generally will be foreign source income,"14 and therefore
will increase P's foreign tax credit limit.
If P is in an excess limitation position, and the foreign corporate
income tax rate is greater than the U.S. corporate income tax rate, the
multinational will reduce its global tax burden by increasing the inter-
est paid by S to p.115 Conversely, when the U.S. corporate income tax
rate is greater than the foreign corporate income tax rate, the mul-
tinational will reduce its global tax burden by decreasing the interest
113 See U.S. MODEL TaRxiy, supra note 7, ar. 10(2) (a) (limiting the rate ofwithholding
tax on dividends to five percent where the recipient is a corporation owning at least 10% of
the voting stock of the company paying the dividends); id. art. 11 (1) (reducing the rate of
withholding tax on interest to zero). Consistent with these provisions of the U.S. Model
Treaty, many European countries do not impose any withholding tax on interest paid to a
U.S. parent corporation, but do impose a withholding tax on dividends, generally at five
percent. Japan imposes withholding taxes on dividends and interest at the same rate of
10%. On the other hand, Belgium and Canada impose a higher withholding tax rate on
interest (15%) than on dividends (5% and 10%, respectively).
114 I.R.C. §§ 861(a) (1), 862(a) (1) (West Supp. 1993). However, if the intercompany
loan is foreign-currency denominated, the foreign currency "interest" received will be
treated in part as interest (based on the average exchange rate for each accrual period)
and in part as foreign currency gain or loss (based on the spot exchange rate on the date
payments are received). Treas. Reg. § 1.988-2(b) (2) (ii) (C) and (b) (3) (1992). Any for-
eign currency exchange gain will be U.S. source income, and any foreign exchange loss
will be allocated to U.S. source income. Treas. Reg. § 1.988-4(a) (1992).
115 If P is in an excess limitation position, the payment of $1 of interest by S to P will
result in a net change in global tax liability of t rtf, where td is the U.S. corporate income tax
rate and tf is the host country's corporate income tax rate.
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paid by S to P. In the latter case, the multinational will be better off
replacing the intercompany debt with equity, which would enable the
multinational to defer U.S. corporate income taxation by accumulat-
ing earnings abroad. On the other hand, if P is in an excess credit
position, the multinational will reduce its global tax burden by in-
creasing the interest paid by S to P, regardless of which country has
the higher corporate income tax rate, provided that the foreign cor-
porate income tax rate is greater than the foreign withholding tax rate
on interest payments." 16
In theory, the multinational could change the amount of interest
paid by S to P by adjusting the interest rate on intercompany loans,
but this strategy would leave the multinational vulnerable to attack
under transfer pricing rules. In practice, therefore, the multinational
is likely to change the amount of interest paid by S to P by adjusting
the amounts of equity and intercompany debt used to finance S.
2. Third-party Lending
Even without directly making intercompany loans, a multina-
tional can arrange its financial structure to achieve global tax minimi-
zation. Consider again the case of a U.S. corporation, P, with a
foreign subsidiary, S. Suppose for simplicity that both P and S have
borrowed funds from third parties at the same interest rate, r, and
that the applicable currency exchange rate is constant. If P repays $1
of its debt and S simultaneously borrows an additional $1, the result
will be to shift r x $1 of annual income from Sto P. The multinational
will reduce its global tax liability by shifting income from affiliates that
are subject to high corporate income tax rates to affiliates that are
subject to low corporate income tax rates.
Once again, it is necessary to refine this analysis to take into ac-
count the effect of the borrowing on P's foreign tax credit limitation.
Under U.S. tax law, a portion of the interest expense of a U.S. corpo-
ration must be allocated to foreign source gross income if the corpo-
ration has assets producing foreign source gross income." 7 A portion
of P's interest expense will therefore be allocated to foreign source
gross income because P owns the stock of S, an asset producing for-
eign source gross income (dividends). If P is in an excess credit posi-
tion, the allocation of a portion of P's interest expense to foreign
source gross income reduces P's binding foreign tax credit limitation
and therefore is equivalent to the denial of a deduction for this por-
tion of the interest expense. This can give a U.S.-based multinational
116 If Pis in an excess credit position, the payment of $1 of interest by S to P will result
in a net change in global tax liability of wg-tr, where wf is the rate of the host country's
withholding tax on interest payments and tf is the host country's corporate income tax rate.
117 I.R.C. § 864(e)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
[Vol. 79:18
SOURCE-BASED TAXATION
in an excess credit position an incentive to shift third-party debt from
the U.S. parent corporation to foreign subsidiaries, even if the foreign
subsidiaries are subject to lower corporate income tax rates than the
parent corporation. The lower the foreign corporate income tax rate,
however, the less the incentive to shift the debt.
There are likely to be few non-governmental constraints on the
multinational's ability to arrange its financial structure in order to
minimize its global tax liability. Even assuming that there is an opti-
mal debt-to-equity ratio for the multinational as a whole," 8 it is likely
to be irrelevant, apart from the tax consequences, how the debt is
allocated among the affiliates. This is because, as a practical matter,
the parent corporation will almost certainly keep lenders whole if an
affiliate defaults, even if it has no legal obligation to do so."19 There-
fore, in determining what interest rate to demand, lenders to an affili-
ate of a multinational are likely to take into account the
multinational's consolidated debt-to-equity ratio, rather than the sepa-
rate debt-to-equity ratio of the affiliate.
Nevertheless, there are several possible constraints on the extent
to which a multinational will use financial maneuvering to minimize
global taxes. All else being equal, if one affiliate has unique access to
low-cost loans, such as government-subsidized loans or loans from in-
ternational agencies, the multinational might want to have that affili-
ate incur the maximum amount of debt possible. In addition, the
multinational might wish to adopt a strategy of requiring each affiliate
to meet most of its own financing needs with local borrowing. This
strategy can reduce political risks, such as governmental expropriation
or imposition of exchange controls,120 and reduce the risks associated
with exchange rate fluctuations. 121 The multinational also might pur-
sue this strategy in order to diversify its sources of funds, thus lessen-
ing its dependence on any one financial market and broadening its
sources of economic and financial information. 122 Finally, by relying
on local financial institutions to monitor the activities of its foreign
affiliates, this strategy could reduce the multinational's agency
costs. 123 Nevertheless, despite these possible constraints, multination-
118 See BREALE" & MYERs, supra note 80, at 922 (concluding that there is no accepted,
coherent theory about capital structure); CoPELAND & WETON, supra note 84, at 536
(same; noting that "casual empiricism" suggests that firms behave as though an optimal
capital structure does exist).
119 ALAN C. SNAPIRo, MuL NATIONAL FiNANcIAL MANAGEMENT 747 (3d ed. 1989).
120 See id at 734-35; BRaALm, & MYERs, supra note 80, at 879-80.
121 See SHAPiRO, supra note 119, at 734.
122 See id. at 737-38.
123 See id. at 746. However, if the local financial institutions believe that the multina-
tional will keep them whole if the affiliate defaults, as suggested above, they will not have a
strong incentive to monitor the activities of the foreign affiliate.
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als are likely to have considerable flexibility to adjust their global fi-
nancial structure to minimize taxes.
B. Application of the Arm's Length Standard to Financial
Maneuvering
Arm's length pricing rules are of limited value in preventing mul-
tinationals from using financial maneuvering to reduce taxes.
Although these rules can be used to adjust non-arm's length interest
rates on intercompany loans, financial maneuvering does not depend
on non-arm's length charges. In order to use the arm's length stan-
dard to counter financial maneuvering, the tax agency must
recharacterize intercompany debt as equity (or deny deductions for
interest expense on such debt) on the ground that unrelated firms
would not have lent to one another under similar conditions. More
difficult still, the tax agency must recharacterize third-party lending
on the ground that the lenders would not have lent to independent
firms on the same basis that they lent to affiliates of the multinational.
This type of recharacterization has proven to be difficult in the
analogous context of loans by shareholders to closely held corpora-
tions. The judicial approaches to the problem of distinguishing be-
tween debt and equity in this context have been largely ad hoc,124 and
regulatory attempts to systematize the analysis have failed.125 If the
government could determine the optimal debt-to-equity ratio for a
given firm, it could insist that each affiliate of a multinational conform
to this ratio. As indicated above, however, financial theory has not
conclusively established that such an optimal ratio exists. Even if such
a ratio does exist, it is likely that the value of a firm is relatively con-
124 See, e.g., Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696-97 (3d Cir. 1968)
(listing 16 criteria for determining whether an investment in the form of debt should be
recharacterized as equity, but noting that no series of criteria can provide a conclusive
answer). See generally William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate
Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal 26 TAX L. REv. 369 (1971).
125 In 1969, Congress enacted § 385, which authorizes the Treasury to prescribe regu-
lations to determine whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated as stock or debt
for Federal income tax purposes. Eleven years later, on March 24, 1980, the Treasury
issued proposed regulations under § 385. 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957 (1980). These regulations
became final on December 31, 1980, with an effective date of May 1, 1981. T.D. 7747, 45
Fed. Reg. 86,438 (1980). This effective date was later postponed to January 1, 1982, and
then toJuly 1, 1982. E.g., T.D. 7774, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,945 (1981). The Treasury issued new
proposed regulations on December 30, 1981, anticipating that these would go into effect
on July 1, 1982. T.D. 7801, 47 Fed. Reg. 164 (1982). However, these regulations never
became effective. The Treasury withdrew all of the § 385 regulations on July 6, 1983. T.D.
7920, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,054 (1983). To date, no additional regulations have been issued. As
the Joint Committee on Taxation has noted, "[t] he section 385 regulations did not succeed
in the attempt to develop objective standards for distinguishing debt from equity." STAFF
OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATiON, 101ST CONG., 1ST SEss., FEDERAL INCOME TAX AsPEcrs
OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRucrurEs 37 (Comm. Print 1989).
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stant over a wide range of debt-to-equity ratios. 126 In any case, an ex-
tremely wide range of debt-to-equity ratios is observed in practice. As
a result, the search for an arm's length debt-to-equity ratio is destined
to be futile.127
Nevertheless, countries are increasingly enacting measures to
recharacterize "excessive" debt as equity or to deny deductions for in-
terest paid on such debt, particularly when the debt is advanced by
non-resident related parties. 128 Congress first enacted such a "thin
capitalization" or "earnings stripping" provision, Section 1630) of the
Code, in 1989.129 This provision prohibits a corporation from deduct-
ing interest paid to a related foreign party under certain circum-
stances-generally, if the corporation's debt-to-equity ratio exceeds
1.5-to-1 30 and the interest payment is not subject to U.S. tax.' 3 ' Even
then, the prohibition applies only to the extent that the corporation's
net interest expense exceeds 50 percent of its adjusted taxable in-
come. 3 2 This provision involves arbitrary line drawing. The trigger-
ing debt-to-equity ratio of 1.5-to-1 is highly arbitrary, particularly since
assets are generally valued at their adjusted basis.' 33 Moreover, as ex-
plained above, even when triggered, the provision only partially pre-
vents the stripping of earnings.
The Conference Committee Report on Section 1630) argued
that this provision is consistent with the arm's length standard. 34
Under the traditional interpretation of the arm's length standard,
however, one would determine whether a subsidiary was thinly capital-
ized by examining the debt-to-equity ratios of comparable uncon-
126 See SHAPImo, supra note 119, at 739.
127 See Berry et al., supra note 107, at 739 n.19.
128 See Thomas R. Bretz & E. Steven White, Cross-Border Placement/Movement of Indebted-
ness and Tax-Effective Use of Cash Accumulated Offshore, 68 TAXES 1103, 1119-21 (1990) (sum-
marizing "thin capitalization" measures in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom).
129 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7210(a), 103
Stat. 2106, 233942 (enacting I.R.C. § 163(j))."
130 I.R.C. § 163(0) (2) (A) (ii) (West Supp. 1993).
'3' I.R.C. § 1630) (3) (A) (West Supp. 1993), as amended by Revenue Reconciliation Act
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13228. To the extent that the U.S. withholding tax on an
interest payment is reduced by treaty to a rate below the statutory 30-percent rate, the
interest payment is treated as not subject to U.S. tax. Id. § 1630) (5) (B) (West Supp. 1993),
as amended by Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13228.
132 I.R.C. § 163(0) (2) (B) (West Supp. 1993).
'33 I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1993).
134 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 569-70 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C-.AN 3018, 3172-73. Unless the provision merely adjusts the income of the U.S.
subsidiary of a foreign parent corporation to reflect the income the subsidiary would have
earned had its dealings with the parent been conducted on an arm's length basis, it is likely
that the provision violates the nondiscrimination provisions of the United States's income
tax treaties. As the House report conceded, the impact of the provision will likely fall
predominately on foreign-based multinational corporations. H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1249 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CAN. 1906, 2719.
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trolled corporations. As the conferees recognized, uncontrolled
corporations exhibit an extremely wide range of debt-to-equity ratios,
sometimes far exceeding 1.5-to-1. 8 5 The conferees dealt with this
awkward fact by simply rejecting the view that the arm's length stan-
dard is satisfied if unrelated parties would have entered into a transac-
tion involving the same thinness of capitalization, conceding that
"It]his may be different from the ordinary use of the term 'arm's
length' under Code section 482."136 Instead, the conferees asserted
that thin capitalization rules based on averages among firms and typi-
cal patterns are consistent with the arm's length standard.1 37
The OECD took a contrary approach in its report on thin capital-
ization.'38 The OECD report concludes that thin capitalization rules
are consistent with the arm's length principle only if they are based on
a facts-and-circumstances approach using evidence of transactions be-
tween independent parties.139 The report notes that the majority of
the OECD countries believe that use of a fixed debt-to-equity ratio,
such as one fixed by reference to the kind of ratio commonly found in
the open market, "would undoubtedly be inconsistent with the arm's
length principle" unless used merely as a rebuttable presumption. 40
While the OECD approach is consistent with the traditional interpre-
tation of the arm's length principle, it fails to produce workable stan-
dards. The OECD report concedes that an arm's length approach is
difficult to apply to thin capitalization problems because of "the ab-
sence of any clear guidelines as to what are the practices adopted by
independent parties, and thus the difficulty of devising any consistent
practice." 141
In any event, Section 1630) imposes only limited constraints on a
multinational's intercompany financing decisions. Moreover, mul-
tinationals might be able to avoid even this limited constraint by using
the services of a multinational bank. Rather than have the foreign
parent corporation lend funds directly to its U.S. subsidiary, the par-
ent can lend to a branch of a multinational bank and have the subsidi-
ary borrow from another branch of the same bank. In theory, the IRS
can recharacterize such a back-to-back loan as a direct intercompany
loan. 42 In many cases, however, the parent can accomplish the same
135 See H.R. CoNf. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 569-70 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.G.A.N. 3018, 3172.
136 Id. at 569.
137 Id. at 570.
138 OECD THIN CAPrrA USATIoN REPORT, supra note 70, at 29-32.
139 Id 75, at 30.
140 Id. 79, at 31.
141 Id 25, at 15.
142 See Rev. Rul. 87-89, 1987-2 C.B. 195; Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381; Rev. Rul. 84-
153, 1984-2 C.B. 383. The House Ways and Means Committee report on the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 states that the committee intended that the Treasury
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result by simply reducing its borrowing from its branch, in which case
the back-to-back loan analysis does not readily apply. Alternatively,
the foreign parent corporation can guarantee a bank loan to its U.S.
subsidiary in lieu of making a direct intercompany loan. Prior to en-
actment of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, the IRS could
have attacked such a transaction only by arguing that in substance the
bank made the loan to the parent, which either re-lent the funds to
the subsidiary or contributed the funds to the capital of the subsidi-
ary.143 In the former case, Section 163(j) would be applicable to the
deemed intercompany loan. In the latter case, the subsidiary's inter-
est payments would be characterized as nondeductible dividends. In
1993, Congress amended Section 163 0) to apply directly to such guar-
anteed loans. 44 Even so, this new provision does not appear to be
applicable where the bank lends to the subsidiary with only a tacit
understanding that the parent corporation will repay the loan if the
subsidiary defaults.' 45 In conclusion, the large scope of permissible
creative financial maneuvering will seemingly allow multinationals to
stay one step ahead of the tax authorities.
IV
GovERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO AN INDETERMINATE
STANDARD
A. Enforcement
As long as the rules for combatting transfer pricing and financial
maneuvering rely on an indeterminate standard, enforcement of
would use its regulatory authority under § 163Q) to issue regulations treating back-to-back
loans through third parties like direct loans to related parties. H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1246-47 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CAN. 1906, 2716-17. The pro-
posed regulations under § 1630) have reserved comment on how § 1630) will apply if such
techniques are used, however, reflecting the difficulty of the problem. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1630)-9, 56 Fed. Reg. 27907 (1991) (reserved for regulation dealing with guarantees
and back-to-back loans). In addition, Congress in 1993 specifically authorized the Treasury
to issue regulations establishing rules for recharacterizing multiple-party financing transac-
tions as transactions directly among any two or more parties, where recharacterization is
appropriate to prevent tax avoidance. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-66, § 13238 (enacting new Code § 7701(1)).
143 See Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1076 (1972). See also H.R. CoNw. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1989),
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.N. 3018,3170; H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1246-47
(1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CA.N. 1906, 2716-17.
144 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13228 (amending I.R.C.
§ 1630)).
145 Section 1630), as amended, defines "guarantee" to include "any arrangement
under which a person (directly or indirectly through an entity or otherwise) assures, on a
conditional or unconditional basis, the payment of another person's obligation under any
indebtedness," except as provided in regulations. I.RC. § 163 0) (6) (D) (iii) (West Supp.
1993), as amended by Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13228.
Although this definition is broad, it is presumably not infinitely elastic.
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those rules will in many cases have primarily an in terrorem effect. Con-
sider the case of a multinational with operations in two countries, and
suppose that the multinational sets transfer prices and establishes its
financial structure to achieve goals other than global tax minimiza-
tion.146 If one of the countries subsequently enacts aggressive transfer
pricing and thin capitalization rules and, in enforcing these rules, re-
solves all indeterminacies in its own favor,147 the multinational will
likely seek to avoid costly disputes and possible penalties by changing
its transfer prices and financial structure to increase the proportion of
consolidated income reported in that country.148 This increase in the
enforcing country's tax base will come at the expense of the other
country's tax base. The other country might respond to the erosion
of its tax base by tightening its own rules and taking extreme positions
in its enforcement actions.149 In the end, the multinational might
well revert to its initial transfer pricing and financial policies, particu-
larly if these served significant internal purposes. As a result, the gov-
ernments and the multinational will incur substantial additional costs
146 The multinational might be in a situation where transfer pricing and financial ma-
neuvering would have little effect on its global tax liability. This would likely be the case if,
for example, the corporate income tax rates in the two countries were similar, the parent
corporation were not in an excess credit position, and the home country did not have an
integrated tax system that provided integration benefits to shareholders only with respect
to domestic corporate income tax payments.
147 A country that took such actions would risk deterring transnational investment,
possibly to that country's long-term detriment. Nevertheless, the country might find this
strategy attractive if its political leaders had a short-term perspective, because the strategy
might maximize tax revenues in the short term, or if its political leaders wanted to use the
income tax system to protect or otherwise benefit particular domestic industries or other
interest groups. Cf Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation,
90 MicH. L. Rxv. 895, 930-32 (1992) (discussing the political basis for tax discrimination
against out-of-state producers or consumers).
148 In the case of the United States, some foreign observers viewed the enactment of
the commensurate-with-income provision of § 482, see supra note 87, as an attempt to en-
courage taxpayers to overstate their U.S. income tax at the expense of foreign govern-
ments. See, e.g., John A. Calderwood, Pricing for Intangibles, Goods and Services Under Super-
Royalty: A Canadian rww, in TRANSFER PRICING FOR INTANGIBLES: A COMMENTARY ON THE
WHITE PAPER 51, 56 (Fred C. de Hosson ed., 1989); Go Kawada, Comments on Section 482
White Paper, in TRANSFER PRICING FOR INTANGIBLES, supra, at 62, 63. Mr. Calderwood was the
Director of the International Audits Division, Revenue Canada, Taxation, and Mr. Kawada
was the Director, Office of International Operations, Ministry of Finance, Tokyo. The re-
cent U.S. enactment of penalties for transfer price misstatements, see supra note 8, also
might be viewed as an attempt to induce multinationals to shift income to the United
States, particularly given the acknowledged lack of clear guidance on how to determine
arm's length prices.
149 For example, Japanese tax auditors reportedly have begun aggressively to enforce
Japan's transfer pricing rules, which took effect in 1987. See Gary M. Thomas, Japan, 3 TAx
NOTES INT'L 859, 860 (1991); see also Akira Akamatsu & Gary M. Thomas, Update of Recent
Japanese Developments in Transfer-Pricing Enforcement, 5 TAx NOTES INT'L 227 (1992).
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of enforcement, compliance, and dispute resolution, 50 yet neither
government will increase its tax revenue. 15'
Thus, international enforcement of the arm's length standard
might assume characteristics of the prisoner's dilemma.152 Each
country acting separately has an incentive to maximize enforcement,
regardless of what other countries do, though all countries might be
better off if they could agree to enforce the arm's length standard
only in clearly abusive cases.
B. Corporate Income Tax Rates
An international system of source-based corporate income taxa-
tion is vulnerable to tax competition because multinationals will re-
spond to tax rate differentials in determining where to locate their
investments. This section discusses the dynamics of this process and
suggests that there are several limits on the extent to which the mobil-
ity of physical investment threatens the stability of the present system.
A much greater potential threat comes from the ability of multination-
als to shift the reported location of their profits through transfer pric-
ing and financial maneuvering.
Consider an idealized world in which all countries impose a
purely source-based 15 corporate income tax at the same rate and us-
150 Litigation involving proposed § 482 adjustments for Sundstrand Corporation's tax-
able years 1977 and 1978 provides an indication of the magnitude of these costs. Sunds-
trand reportedly spent millions of dollars and thousands of work hours on its defense,
which resulted in more than 2,000 pages of testimony, hundreds of stipulations, 2,000 pro-
posed findings of fact, and 1,800 pages of briefs. See Deborah Siebrandt, Practitioners Dis-
cuss Accounting, Transfer Pricing Issues at Silicon Valley Conference, 53 TAx NOTES 1110 (1991).
The Tax Court issued a final decision in February 1991, more than 11 years after the IRS
audit began. Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226 (1991).
151 If the two governments impose conflicting requirements on the multinational and
do not resolve the conflict through mutual agreement, their tax revenues might increase in
the short run, but will likely decrease in the long run as international business activity
diminishes.
152 The "prisoner's dilemma," a situation studied in game theory, involves the follow-
ing scenario: Two suspects are arrested for a crime and separated. The district attorney is
certain they are guilty of a specific crime but does not have enough evidence to convict
them without a confession. She tells each suspect that if he confesses and his companion
does not, she will recommend that he receive a sentence of three months, whereas his
companion will receive the maximum sentence of 10 years. If both confess, she will recom-
mend that each receive a sentence of eight years. Each suspect knows that if neither con-
fesses, the lack of evidence will cause them to be tried for a lesser crime for which each will
receive a sentence of one year. Each suspect will minimize his sentence by confessing,
regardless of what the other suspect does. But if each suspect adopts this strategy, the
result will be suboptimal: Each will receive an eight-year sentence rather than the one-year
sentence that would result if neither confessed. See K DuNcAN LUCE & HowARD RAIFFA,
GAMES AND DECISIONS 94-97 (1957). International enforcement of the arm's length stan-
dard differs from the classic prisoner's dilemma situation because countries, unlike prison-
ers, can coordinate their strategies and because they repeat the "game" indefinitely.
153 That is, all countries tax corporations on income earned from sources within the
country and exempt foreign source income from taxation.
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ing the same tax base. This system of taxation will not distort the in-
ternational allocation of capital. Suppose, however, that one country
were to lower its tax rate. This would induce multinationals, at the
margin, to locate new investment in the low-tax country rather than in
the remaining high-tax countries. 54 The tax cut would decrease the
country's tax revenue from the investment existing in the country at
the time of the change and from new investment that would have
been made in the country even without the rate reduction. On the
other hand, the tax cut would attract additional corporate investment
and consequently augment the country's tax base. Furthermore, the
growth in investment would increase the income earned by the own-
ers of immobile factors of production (such as land and labor) lo-
cated within the country. Depending on the magnitude of these
responses, the tax cut might appear attractive from a purely national
perspective.
From an international perspective, however, the unilateral tax cut
is a beggar-thy-neighbor strategy. Much of the additional investment
that is channeled to the low-tax country because of the tax cut will
come at the expense of the remaining high-tax countries, and will
earn a lower than optimal before-tax rate of return.155 If the low-tax
country sets its tax rate from a purely national perspective and on the
assumption that the tax policies of other countries are fixed, it will fail
to consider these negative external effects.' 56 The remaining high-tax
countries, however, might respond to the outflow of investment by
lowering their own corporate income tax rates. This process will re-
sult in a global reduction of corporate income tax rates, culminating
in rates below the level that countries would have set had they
adopted a cooperative approach. 157
The basic analysis of international tax competition presented
above must be refined to take into account several factors that contrib-
154 This statement assumes that the low-tax country does not match its tax cut with a
reduction in the public goods and services that benefit corporations. This assumption will
generally be satisfied. As discussed above, there is little relationship between the corporate
income tax that a corporation pays and the benefits that it receives from the government.
See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
155 To some extent, however, the additional investment might come from additional
saving induced by the tax cut.
156 SeeJoel Slemrod, Tax Principles in an International Economy, in WoRLD TAX REFORM:
CASE STUDIES IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUTRIEs 11, 20 (Michael J. Boskin &
Charles E. McLure, Jr. eds., 1990).
157 There is, however, no assurance that this cooperative solution would have been
optimal. If distortions in the political process cause governments to maintain corporate
income taxes at higher than optimal levels, the pressure created by international tax com-
petition to reduce corporate income tax rates could be beneficial. See id. at 20. The prob-
lem is that international tax competition does not contain any built-in mechanism to
ensure that when corporate income taxes fall to an optimal level, equilibrium will be
reached.
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ute to the sustainability of corporate income taxation. First, physical
investment, while mobile in the long run, is fixed in the short run. A
factory cannot be picked up and moved to another country. Rather,
physical capital moves from one country to another gradually. Ex-
isting investment in one location depreciates and is not replaced; new
investment is begun in a different location. As a result, governments
can efficiently tax income from existing investment, which is immo-
bile. It is only new investment that might be driven abroad by high
tax rates. 158 Therefore, if a government taxes corporations at rates
higher than those imposed in other countries, it will maximize reve-
nue in the short run, but will deter new investment. As a result, the
long-run burden of the incremental tax will probably be borne by im-
mobile domestic groups, such as labor. If politicians have a suffi-
ciently short-term perspective, this trade-off will likely appear
attractive.
Second, if a country raises its corporate income tax rate, the in-
ducement for corporations to locate new investment elsewhere will
occur only at the margin. To the extent that new corporate invest-
ment can earn a higher before-tax rate of return in the country than it
could elsewhere, it will not be driven away by higher tax rates.159 A
country might have a number of features, such as natural resources,
relatively inexpensive labor, or a large market of affluent consumers,
that enable corporations to earn higher than marginal before-tax
rates of return.160 It is generally believed that these features are more
important than tax rates in determining the location of new direct
investment.161
Finally, a group of similar countries might succeed in maintain-
ing corporate income tax rates at a common equilibrium level
through a process of mutual forbearance. Each country might refrain
from attempts to attract corporate investment by lowering its tax rate,
158 The ideal strategy from a government's point of view would be to tax income from
existing investment and, at the same time, to promise not to tax income from new invest-
ment. One difficulty with this strategy is that governments generally cannot bind them-
selves to future actions, and therefore cannot make convincing promises about their future
tax policies. If a government taxes income from existing investment, investors will likely
assume that it will also tax income from new investment, at least once the investment is
firmly in place.
159 See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Lessons for LDCs of U.S. Income Tax Reform, in TAx RFFORM
IN DEVELOPING CouNauEs 347, 357 (Malcolm Gillis ed., 1989).
160 To some extent, these features are created by governmental programs, which are
financed by taxes. This might suggest that the government could raise corporate income
taxes, use the revenue to increase the attractiveness of the country to business, and not lose
any investment. Once again, the problem with this analysis is that the corporate income
tax burden faced by each business bears little relationship to the value of government
programs to that particular business. See supra note 154.
161 See DoNALDJ.S. BAN, INTERNATIONAL IssuEs IN TAXATION: THE CANADIAN PERSPEC-
Trim 103 (1984).
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if it is aware that such attempts will harm other countries and might
cause them to reciprocate, thus nullifying the expected benefits.
One additional refinement must be made to the analysis
presented above: it is necessary to consider the possible impact of
transfer price manipulation and financial maneuvering. If the inter-
national tax system provides opportunities for such behavior, the in-
centives for countries to lower their corporate tax rates would increase
significantly because by doing so they could expect to induce multina-
tionals to shift reported income into the country. 62
The possibility of shifting reported income reduces the incentives
that multinationals might otherwise have to change the location of
physical investment in response to tax differentials. By shifting in-
come, multinationals can keep physical investment in high-tax coun-
tries without subjecting the income to the higher taxes. At least
initially, therefore, transfer pricing and financial maneuvering im-
prove the international allocation of capital. In the long run, how-
ever, this might not be the case, because the international tax system
is not a simple, purely source-based system. Global tax minimization
strategies often require multinationals to invest the shifted funds lo-
cally rather than repatriate the funds to the home country, even if the
local investment opportunities are sub-optimal. 16 3
The potential for income shifting has a much more destabilizing
effect on the international tax system than does the mobility of physi-
cal investment. Unlike the movement of physical investment, the
movement of reported income (which requires merely a change in
internal prices or in internal financing) can occur virtually instantane-
ously.' 6 4 Moreover, the magnitude of the response is likely to be very
high. If there were no internal or governmental constraints on trans-
fer pricing and financial maneuvering, multinationals might have an
incentive to shift all of their reported profits from a country with high
tax rates to one with even slightly lower tax rates. Unless the multina-
tional's tax minimization strategy depends on investing the shifted
funds locally rather than repatriating them, the existence of location-
specific advantages will not deter this shifting of profits. If, on the
other hand, the multinational's strategy does depend on investing
162 As discussed above, multinationals do not invariably have an incentive to shift in-
come from high-tax to low-tax countries. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
For example, a U.S.-based multinational in an excess credit position with fixed physical
investments often has an incentive to use transfer pricing and financial maneuvering to
shift income to the U.S. parent corporation, even if foreign tax rates are relatively low.
Even so, a foreign country that lowers its corporate income tax rate will reduce the magni-
tude of this incentive.
163 See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
164 Note, however, that too rapid a change would likely catch the attention of tax
authorities.
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shifted funds locally, governments will have an increased incentive to
attract shiftable income and funds for new investment by reducing
corporate income tax rates.
The process of international tax competition described above di-
rectly affects corporate income tax rates. Any reduction in corporate
income tax rates, however, will place downward pressure on individual
income tax rates as well. If a country tries to maintain a system of low
corporate income tax rates and high individual income tax rates, indi-
viduals can indefinitely defer the burden of the high individual in-
come tax with respect to their income from capital by investing their
capital through corporate intermediaries and retaining the earnings
in corporate solution.
Governments could respond to the loss of tax revenue resulting
from such tax competition in several ways. They could reduce govern-
mental services and transfer payments, impose increased taxes directly
on the owners of immobile factors of production such as labor, or, to
the extent feasible, impose user fees and taxes that closely reflect ben-
efits received by taxpayers. In any case, governments would find it
difficult to use tax and expenditure policy to redistribute income from
owners of mobile capital to immobile, and often low-income,
individuals.
This negative assessment of international tax competition con-
trasts with the widely-held view that interjurisdictional tax competition
at the local level, and to a lesser extent at the state level, is generally
beneficial. 165 This latter view assumes that, in the absence of tax com-
petition, the political process will keep taxes and governmental ex-
penditures above the levels preferred by citizens. 166 If, however,
individuals are mobile and communities must compete with one an-
other for residents, the competition will force communities to offer
packages of taxes and services that are attractive to potential resi-
dents. 67 This analysis assumes that communities do not attempt to
impose source-based taxes on mobile capital, but instead raise reve-
nue through user fees and taxes on residents that reflect the benefits
that those residents receive from governmental goods and services. 168
165 See generally ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERJURISDIC-
TIONAL TAX AND POLICY COMPETITION: GOOD OR BAD FOR THE FEDERAL SVSTEM? (1991);
Daphne A. Kenyon &John Kincaid, Introduction, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERAuSM 1 (Daphne A. Kenyon &
John Kincaid eds., 1991).
166 See THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: CoMPErnoN AMONG GOVERNMENTS 21-
23, 68-69 (1990) (citing additional references).
167 The seminal article describing this theory is Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64J. PoL ECON. 416 (1956).
168 See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Tax Competition: Is What's Good for the Private Goose Also
Good for the Public Gander?, 39 NAT'L TAXJ. 341, 341-43 (1986).
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Similarly, if national governments were to forgo attempts to im-
pose source-based corporate income taxes and instead taxed corpo-
rate income exclusively on the basis of residence, 169 national
corporate income taxes would be largely insulated from the pressures
of tax competition. This is because in all but exceptional cases, indi-
viduals are unlikely to change their national residence in response to
tax differentials. 170 Thus, moving to an international system of resi-
dence-based corporate income taxation would not ensure governmen-
tal efficiency or responsiveness to citizens' preferences any more than
a system of source-based corporate income taxation. Residence-based
taxation would, however, enable governments to continue to rely on
income taxation as a cornerstone of a redistributive fiscal policy.
Moving to an international system of residence-based corporate
income taxation may not be feasible, however, because of implemen-
tation and enforcement problems and the difficulty of obtaining inter-
national agreement. Assuming for the moment that this approach is
not feasible, and assuming further that governments desire to main-
tain a comprehensive income tax as a matter of domestic policy, 171
governments must take other steps to preserve the current system of
169 See infra part V.B.
170 If residents were internationally mobile in response to tax differentials, interna-
tional tax competition would tend to drive national tax systems toward a benefit tax struc-
ture, as does tax competition at the state and local levels. As noted above, this precludes
the use of tax policy to redistribute income. This consequence is generally not considered
to be a fatal flaw in the case of tax competition at the state and local levels, even by those
who favor redistributive taxation, but only because it is assumed that redistributive policies
can be carried out effectively by the national government. See, e.g., McLure, supra note 168,
at 346; MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 35, at 454-55; Wallace E. Oates & Robert M.
Schwab, The Allocative and Distributive Implications of Local Fiscal Competition, in COMPETITION
AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCYAND EQuriY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM,
supra note 165, at 127, 128.
171 Some analysts argue that there would be significant advantages to a worldwide shift
from comprehensive income taxation to direct consumption taxation as the international
norm. See, e.g., McLure, supra note 44, at 145 (citing additional references in note 1);
George R. Zodrow & Charles E. McLure, Jr., ImplementingDirect Consumption Taxes in Devel-
oping Countries, 46 TAx L. REy. 405 (1991). This Article does not address this proposal,
because it assumes that governments will maintain comprehensive income taxes as a mat-
ter of domestic policy. See TREASURY INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 33, at 13-14 (noting
the U.S. government's commitment to comprehensive income taxation); Michaelj. Graetz,
Revisiting the Income Tax vs. Consumption Tax Debate, 57 Tx NOTES 1437, 1438 (1992) (not-
ing that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reflects "the recent political decision by both Republi-
cans and Democrats to retain and strengthen the income tax, rather than heed the calls of
economists and some politicians to replace it with a consumption tax"); see, e.g., Gunn,
supra note 36 (arguing in favor of comprehensive income taxation); Pechman, supra note
39 (same). On the other hand, most developed countries rely more heavily than the
United States on consumption taxation and many tax analysts continue to advocate that
the United States supplement or replace the income tax with a consumption tax. See
Graetz, supra, at 1438; see also CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES, THE STRENGTHEN-
ING OF AMERICA COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT 96-102 (1992) (recommending replacement of
the current U.S. income tax with a direct consumption tax). Indeed, the reader might
conclude that the difficulties with maintaining comprehensive income taxation described
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corporate income taxation against pressures from international tax
competition.
The analysis of international tax competition presented above
generally assumes that countries employ purely source-based corpo-
rate income tax systems. The adoption by some countries of tax sys-
tems based on worldwide taxation of residents, with relief from
international double taxation provided by foreign tax credits, poten-
tially contributes to the sustainability of a common equilibrium level
of corporate income taxation.17 2 Consider the United States as an ex-
ample of a gross capital-exporting nation that uses a worldwide system
of taxation. Leaving deferral and cross-crediting aside for the mo-
ment, a country that is host to a large amount of direct investment
from the United States has an incentive to adopt the same corporate
income tax rate and base as the United States.'7 3 If the host country
does so, the corporate income tax that it imposes on U.S.-based mul-
tinationals will be borne fully by the U.S. Treasury as a consequence of
the U.S. foreign tax credit mechanism, and therefore will not deter
such multinationals from investing in the country. The system of
worldwide taxation and foreign tax credits can therefore contribute to
the international convergence of national tax systems. Note, however,
that the existence of deferral and cross-crediting, which give host
in this Article ultimately constitute an argument for abandoning or reducing reliance
upon this form of taxation rather than for strengthening the system.
172 See Roger H. Gordon, Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies2, 47J. FIN.
1159 (1992) (arguing that the United States' dominance as a capital exporting country
during much of the postwar period and its maintenance of a worldwide system of income
taxation might have contributed to the survival of a non-zero equilibrium level of capital
income taxes during this period, in spite of the openness of national economies).
173 See, e.g., RicHARD M. BIRD, TAx NG CORPORATIONS 15 (1980) (noting that "so long as
the United States has a corporate income tax, so should Canada, and at about the same
rates"); Robin Boadway, Corporate Tax Harmonisation: Lessons from Canada, in BEYOND 1992:
A EuROPEAN TAx SYSEM 52, 54 (Malcolm Gammie & Bill Robinson eds., 1989) (noting
that as long as the United States allows a foreign tax credit on corporate taxes paid by
subsidiaries abroad, "Canada would be foolish not to tax these firms on an origin basis and
up to the limit of the allowable credit").
More precisely, the optimal strategy for the host country (ignoring deferral and cross-
crediting) would be first to adopt the broadest possible tax base and then to choose a
statutory tax rate that would result in an effective corporate income tax rate equal to the
effective U.S. corporate income tax rate. In that way, the country's corporate income tax
imposed on a U.S.-based multinational would be fully creditable against the multina-
tional's U.S. tax liability, and the low statutory rate would attract shiftable income. See
Slemrod, supra note 156, at 15-16. Note, however, that in the case of direct investment
made through subsidiaries rather than branches in the host country, the relevant U.S. tax
base consists of earnings and profits, a broader base than taxable income.
The host country also might find it desirable to integrate its corporate and individual
income tax systems, but not to extend integration benefits to foreign shareholders. The
host country's corporate income would then serve domestically as a form of withholding
tax, and internationally as a means of obtaining revenue at the expense of foreign treasur-
ies. SeeAmold C. Harberger, Principles of Taxation Applied to Developing Countries: What Have
We Learned?, in WORLD TAx REFORM, supra note 156, at 25, 36-38.
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countries an incentive to employ lower corporate income tax rates
than the United States, undermines this stabilizing and harmonizing
effect.174
The dynamics of the international tax system discussed above can
be seen in the worldwide tax reform movement that followed the
United Kingdom's tax reform of 1984 and the U.S. tax reform of
1986.175 Both countries lowered their corporate income tax rates and
broadened their corporate income tax bases by reducing investment
incentives. The Canadian response to these reforms is illustrative. In
1987, Canada announced a tax reform package similarly aimed at low-
ering corporate income tax rates and broadening the tax base.176
This reform was motivated in part by the same efficiency concerns
that motivated the reforms in the United Kingdom and the United
States. 177 It is clear, however, that concerns about international tax
competition also motivated the Canadian tax reforms. 178 Canadian
tax analysts believed that if Canada did not reduce its corporate tax
rates toward the U.S. level, the reduced U.S. rates would lead U.S.-
based multinationals to use transfer pricing and increased debt fi-
nancing of Canadian subsidiaries to shift reported taxable income out
174 Cross-crediting might also insulate host countries with high corporate income tax
rates from pressures to lower their rates. This would occur to the extent that U.S.-based
multinationals could credit high taxes against residual U.S. tax liability attributable to for-
eign source income derived in countries with low tax rates.
A country might also want to lower its corporate income tax rates in order to make
foreign control of domestic firms less attractive. Domestically-owned firms would receive a
tax reduction by the full amount of the tax cut. In contrast, multinationals based in for-
eign countries with worldwide tax systems would find their reduced host-country tax liabil-
ity offset by an increased liability to the home-country government because of the foreign
tax credit mechanism. Again, this analysis does not take into account the effects of defer-
ral and cross-crediting. See GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 46, at 49-50.
175 See generally John Bossons, International Tax Competition: The Foreign Government Re-
sponse in Canada and Other Countries, 41 NAT'L TAxJ. 347 (1988) (concluding that the U.S.,
as market leader, sets the corporate income tax rate to which other countries must con-
form); John Whalley, Foreign Responses to U.S. Tax Reform, in Do TAxEs MTrER?: THE IM-
PACT OF ThE TAX REFORM Acr OF 1986, at 286 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1990) (arguing that the
worldwide tax reform movement of the 1980's was partly a direct response to U.S. tax
reform and partly the result of common intellectual influences).
176 CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF FrNANCE, THE WHITE PAPER: TAX REFORM 1987 (1987).
177 See id. at 55, 72; see alsoJack Mintz &John Whalley, Introduction, in THE ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF TAX REFORM 1, 3 (Jack Mintz &John Whalley eds., 1989) (arguing that a broad-
ening of the tax base will reduce the aggregate amount of tax losses, deductions and
credits).
178 SeeJohn Whalley, Recent Tax Reform in Canada: Policy Responses to Global and Domestic
Pressures, in WoRD TAX REFORM, supra note 156, at 73, 81 (stating that the Canadian tax
reforms in 1987 were less the outcome of a conscious strategy for improving the Canadian
tax system than a response to pressures generated by falling corporate and personal tax
rates around the world and the perception that the Canadian tax system undermined the
country's international competitiveness).
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of Canada. 7 9 Analysts also expressed concern that with reduced tax
rates in the United States, Canadian taxes imposed on U.S.-based mul-
tinationals might not be fully creditable against U.S. taxes, and would
thus discourage direct U.S. investment in Canada.8 0
V
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
As discussed above, countries that attempt to maintain high cor-
porate income tax rates will likely find their tax and investment bases
eroded as multinationals move physical capital or shift income to
countries that impose lower taxes. The two principal methods for
shifting income, transfer pricing and financial maneuvering, are not
adequately addressed by the arm's length standard. The difficulties of
applying this standard will only increase as economic activity becomes
increasingly integrated across national boundaries. This in turn will
intensify the problems of tax base erosion and international tax com-
petition. At some point a fundamentally different approach, one that
neutralizes the effects of internal transactions on the multinational's
global income tax liability, will become necessary.181
Without moving away from the current system of source-based
corporate income taxation, the most direct and effective long-term
solution to the problems of tax base erosion and international tax
competition would be concerted international tax harmonization. Al-
ternatively, these problems could be alleviated within the context of a
source-based system through international acceptance of a standard-
ized method for allocating a multinational's worldwide consolidated
income among the source countries. Finally, and most radically, these
problems could be addressed through international adoption of a sys-
tem that granted jurisdiction to tax corporate income solely on the
basis of the residence of the corporation's ultimate individual
shareholders.
It is unlikely that any of these approaches will achieve interna-
tional acceptance in the short or even intermediate term. 8 2 In the
meantime, the United States will have to consider interim approaches
179 Id. at 81; see, e.g.,John Bossons, The Impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Ac on Tax Reform
in Canada, 40 NAT'L TAxJ. 331, 332-34 (1987); D.A. Dodge, Economic Objectives of Tax Re-
form, in Ti ECONOMIC IMPACTs OF TAX RF:oRM, supra note 177, at 36, 37; Vijay M. Jog &
Jack Mintz, Corporate Tax Reform and Its Economic Impact: An Evolution of the Phase 1 Proposals,
in THE ECONOMIC IMPACrS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 177, at 83, 84-85; Mintz & Whalley,
supra note 177, at 3.
180 See sources cited supra note 179.
181 As noted above, this Article assumes that national governments have decided to
maintain systems of income taxation as a matter of domestic policy, and therefore does not
analyze the alternative of moving to consumption taxation as the international norm. See
supra note 171.
182 See infra Part VA.-B.
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that it can implement unilaterally or bilaterally within the framework
of the existing international tax system. A key question in evaluating
these interim approaches should be whether they move the system in
the direction of a desired long-term solution. If successful, an interim
approach might well be adopted by other nations, and might gradu-
ally evolve into an international norm; such norms are extremely diffi-
cult to change, particularly if they become codified in the language of
bilateral tax treaties. 183
A. Long-term Approaches to Preserving an International System
of Source-Based Corporate Income Taxation
1. Harmonization of National Tax Systems
The most direct way for governments to eliminate international
competition for a share of a mobile and shiftable tax base would be to
agree on a common corporate income tax system. Harmonization
would also reduce the tax incentives for multinationals to manipulate
intercompany transactions and would reduce the tax-induced distor-
tions to the international allocation of capital. Moreover, harmoniza-
tion would reduce the costs to multinationals of complying with a
multiplicity of different national tax systems. 184
Harmonization of effective tax rates would be extremely difficult
to attain, however. It would require countries to surrender a great
deal of sovereignty and would preclude their use of corporate income
taxation as a means for implementing national economic policies.
Harmonization of effective tax rates would require agreement
not only on uniform statutory tax rates, but also on a uniform corpo-
rate tax system (classical or integrated) and a uniform definition of
the tax base.' 85 In the United States, the combined federal and state
tax systems would have to be brought into conformity with the inter-
national norm. This would require the elimination, or the complete
harmonization, of all state corporate income tax systems. But even if
statutory tax rates and the definition of the tax base were made uni-
form, effective tax rates would still differ from country to country un-
less tax enforcement, both administrative and judicial, were also
183 See RichardJ. Vann, A Model Tax Treaty for the Asian-Pacfir Region? (Part I), 45 BuLL.
FOR INT'L FiscAL DOCUMENTATION 99, 103 (1991) (discussing the inflexibility of bilateral
tax treaties).
184 The cost savings from harmonization would be partially offset by transition costs
that would arise as governments changed their existing tax systems to conform to the
agreed-upon standard.
185 This would include agreement on such features as depreciation rules, investment
incentives, the treatment of capital gains and losses, the survival of net operating losses,
rules governing the realization and recognition of income, and the treatment of inflation.
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standardized. 8 6 Finally, even if effective tax rates were successfully
harmonized, the goal of investment neutrality would be undermined
by competition on the expenditure side of the budget or in the regu-
latory sphere.'8 7
The benefits of harmonization might also be weakened if tax ha-
ven countries refused to join the system.188 Multinationals could then
evade the harmonized tax systems of the world by channeling their
international transactions through the remaining tax haven countries.
Even if a worldwide harmonized tax system were achieved, it might
lack stability. Governments would be tempted to break the bargain
whenever they perceived a national advantage from doing so, and they
would not necessarily be deterred by tax treaty commitments. 8 9
Thus, to be effective, harmonization might require delegation of na-
tional sovereignty to an international tax authority that would define
the tax system, collect the taxes, and distribute the revenue among the
individual nations.
Harmonization would entail drawbacks as well as benefits, and on
balance it is not clear that complete harmonization would be a desira-
ble objective. The differences in national tax systems are not merely
irrational impediments to international allocative efficiency. Rather,
they often reflect substantial economic, political, and social differ-
ences among countries.190 Even if these national differences were not
186 See Sijbren Cnossen, On the Direction of Tax Harmonization in the European Community,
in REFORMING CAPrrAL INCOME TAXATION 209, 217 (Horst Siebert ed., 1990).
187 See id
188 For a description of tax haven countries, see WALTER H. DLAMoND & DOROTHY DIA-
moND, TAx HAVENS OF Tm WoRD (1993).
189 See generally COMMrrTEE ON FIsCAL AFFAiRs, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERA-
TION AND DEVELOPmENT, TAx TREATY OVERRmES (1989), reprinted in 2 TAx NoTEs INT'L
2525 (1990) (expressing opposition to domestic legislation intended to have effects in
"clear contradiction to international treaty obligations."). Under U.S. law, for example,
international treaties and statutes are of equal force. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, § 2; I.R.C.
§ 7852(d) (1) (West 1993); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIoNS LAW OF
THE UNrrED STATES § 115(1) (a), § 115 cmt. a and reporter's note 1 (1986). Thus, under
domestic law, Congress can override a treaty provision by subsequently enacting inconsis-
tent legislation. See id.; The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1871). By doing so,
Congress breaches an obligation of the United States under international law. See RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF maE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 115(1)(b), § 115
cmt. b and reporter's note 2 (1986). However, the aggrieved treaty partner has few reme-
dies. See Al INCOME TAX TREATY PROjECT, supra note 15, at 73-76. In recent years, Con-
gress has shown considerable willingness to override treaties through legislative
enactments. See id. at 4, 69-72; Richard L. Doernberg, Legislative Override of Income Tax
Treaties: The Branch Profits Tax and Congressional Arrogation of Authority, 42 TAx LAw. 173
(1989).
190 These include differences in areas such as preferences for public sector size, per
capita costs of providing government services, levels of public debt, rates of inflation, feasi-
bility of implementing various alternative taxes, and views of the desirability of using tax
policy to provide various economic incentives and disincentives. See Cnossen, supra note
186, at 218.
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present, it might be desirable to have experimentation on the na-
tional level with different tax policies.191
An additional drawback to harmonization, at least in the absence
of an international tax authority, is that the need for international
agreement would make the task of changing the tax system difficult
and time-consuming. This would impede countries from adjusting
their tax systems rapidly in response to changes in economic circum-
stances and, in particular, from using tax policy as an instrument for
macroeconomic stabilization. 192
More modest harmonization goals would be easier to achieve.
Harmonization of statutory rates, for example, would reduce the tax
incentive for multinationals to shift income by engaging in transfer
pricing or financial maneuvering, because the tax benefits from these
practices depend on differences in statutory rates rather than on dif-
ferences in effective rates.193 An even more modest goal would be
agreement on a minimum statutory corporate tax rate, which would
place a floor on the extent to which tax competition could result in
reduced rates. 194
Harmonization would not necessarily eliminate the problem of
transfer pricing and financial manipulation; it would merely reduce
the tax-minimizing incentive to engage in these actions.' 95 A multina-
tional still might, for example, shift reported income to the country
where its shareholders and managers reside in order to increase the
amount (or decrease the personal tax cost) of public goods and serv-
ices enjoyed by those individuals. Thus, even with complete harmoni-
zation, governments might find it necessary to enforce the arm's
length standard to protect their tax bases. 196
191 But see Shaviro, supra note 147, at 973-74 (questioning the benefits of governmental
experimentation in the tax area).
192 See generaUyJOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX PoLIcy 8-37 (5th ed. 1987) (discuss-
ing the use of taxation as an instrument for stabilizing the economy at high employment,
maintaining price stability, and promoting economic growth and efficiency).
193 See Slemrod, supra note 156, at 21.
194 A Committee established by the Commission of the European Communities re-
cently recommended that the Commission prepare, by the end of 1994, a draft directive
requiring all Member States to adopt a minimum statutory corporate income tax rate of
30%, and that, at a later stage, it direct all Member States to adopt a maximum statutory
corporate income tax rate of 40%. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrIES, REPORT
OF THE COMMrITEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON COMPANY TAXATION 209-10 (1992).
195 Even if corporate taxes were harmonized, multinationals might engage in transfer
pricing or financial maneuvering in order to reduce their liability for withholding taxes.
196 In the White Paper, the Treasury rejected a proposed "safe harbor" under which the
IRS would not make transfer price adjustments if the tax rate in the foreign jurisdiction
was at least 90 percent of the U.S. rate. The Treasury anticipated that taxpayers would
sometimes engage in transfer price manipulation even if it did not result in global tax
savings. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 76-77.
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2. Unitary Taxation with Formula Apportionment
If countries agreed to tax multinationals on the basis of their
worldwide consolidated incomes ("worldwide unitary taxation"), there
would be no need for tax authorities to examine and recharacterize
internal transactions. Consolidated income could be allocated among
countries in accordance with an agreed-upon formula based on fac-
tors such as the proportion of the multinational's total property, pay-
roll, and sales in each country ("formula apportionment"). 197
Formula apportionment and, to a lesser extent, unitary taxation are
currently used by state governments to allocate jurisdiction to tax the
income of corporations that engage in multistate businesses.198
This approach has a number of advantages over the arm's length
method. It is more consistent with the economic reality that highly
integrated multinationals operate as a unit, with each affiliate contrib-
uting to the overall profit of the enterprise, rather than as a group of
separate entities acting at arm's length.199 It provides greater cer-
tainty for taxpayers by requiring a division of profits rather than a
search for arm's length prices and arm's length financial arrange-
ments. It does not interfere with the multinational's transfer pricing
or financial decisions, which have important implications for the effi-
cient operation of the enterprise.200 It also focuses directly on the
ultimate question of how to achieve an equitable division of the inter-
national corporate income tax base.201 Ironically, this very feature
guarantees that it would be difficult to attain international agreement.
197 Although widely used by the states in the United States, a formula based on prop-
erty, payroll, and sales is difficult to justify and undoubtedly could be improved upon. See
William Vickrey, An Updated Agenda for Progressive Taxation, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 257, 260-61
(1992) (referring to the three-factor formula as a "simple but arbitrary and capricious
formula [that] has all the earmarks of having been concocted by a committee of lawyers
who had forgotten anything they ever were taught about statistics or economics.").
198 See Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 7A U.LA. § 1 (1978). Many
states apply formula apportionment only to individual corporations. Some states combine
formula apportionment with "unitary" taxation; that is, the state requires a group of corpo-
rations under common control and engaging in interdependent operations to file a com-
bined report, and the state then uses formula apportionment to allocate a fraction of the
group's consolidated income to the state. A few states apply unitary taxation on a world-
wide basis; that is, they require foreign as well as domestic affiliates to be included in the
combined report. See generally Charles E. McLure, Jr., Economic Integration and European
Taxation of Corporate Income at Source: Some Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 29 Euv TAX'N
243, 245-47 (1989) (describing the use of formula apportionment and unitary taxation in
the United States and its relevance for international taxation).
199 See U.S. GENERAL. AccoUnING OFrmc, supra note 73, at 50-52; Johnny C. Finch, The
Apportionment of Multistate and Multinational Corporate Income for Tax Purposes, 38 BUL. FOR
INT'L FIscAL DOCUMENTATION 51, 56-57 (1984); Note, supra note 12, at 1202, 1228.
200 See Note, supra note 12, at 1216-19, 1228.
201 See Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on the Allocation of Income and Expenses Among Na-
tional Tax Jurisdictions, 10 Lw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 409, 415 (1978).
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The arm's length method is probably superior to the unitary
method, however, in the case of multinationals whose affiliates are not
highly integrated. The intercompany transactions of such multina-
tionals are likely to have market counterparts. Thus, by comparing
the intercompany transactions with similar transactions in the market,
the arm's length standard is likely to be relatively easy to administer
and would prevent tax-induced affiliations. The states that use the
unitary method treat commonly controlled corporations as a "unitary"
business only if their activities are sufficiently interdependent.20 2 The
definition of a unitary business is a continuing source of controversy
where unitary taxation is used20 3 and would likely be a source of con-
troversy in the international arena as well. 204 International agreement
on the definition of a unitary business would be necessary; if one juris-
diction taxes a multinational under the unitary method and another
jurisdiction taxes the multinational under the separate-accounting
method, the result will likely be under-taxation or over-taxation. 20 5
In order to eliminate under-taxation and over-taxation, it would
also be necessary to obtain international agreement on the apportion-
ment formula, the methods for valuing the factors in the formula,206
and the definition of taxable income (the total amount to be appor-
tioned among the jurisdictions). 20 7 This in turn would require agree-
ment on approaches to currency translation.2 08 Since each country
would have an incentive to use a formula and valuation methods that
emphasize the factors most in abundance in that country, these agree-
ments would be difficult to achieve.20 9
202 See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Defining a Unitay Business: An Economist's View, in TiH
STATE CORPORATION INCOME TAX: ISSUES IN WORLDWIDE UNITARY COMBINATION 89 (Charles
E. McLure, Jr. ed., 1984).
203 See Finch, supra note 199, at 57-58.
204 See Note, supra note 12, at 1229-30.
205 See McLure, supra note 198, at 248.
206 The valuation problem would be particularly difficult if the apportionment
formula were to include intangible assets.
207 See McLure, supra note 198, at 248; Surrey, supra note 201, at 416.
208 Suppose, for example, the U.S. dollar had depreciated relative to foreign curren-
cies during the year. Under U.S. principles, a foreign-based multinational might be con-
sidered profitable on a consolidated basis, merely because of the appreciation in value
(measured in U.S. dollars) of its overseas assets. The United States would then tax the U.S.
affiliate on a portion of this consolidated income. From the home country's perspective,
however, the multinational as a whole, and the U.S. affiliate in particular, might appear to
have operated at a loss.
209 See Note, supra note 12, at 1230-31. This phenomenon can be observed at the state
level in the United States. Although the states generally use a three-factor formula based
on property, payroll, and sales, they do not use exactly the same formula or definitions of
the factors. States that are predominantly market states rather than producing states tend
to give extra weight to the sales factor. See Shaviro, supra note 147, at 918; McLure, supra
note 198, at 247 (noting substantial nonuniformity in state corporate income tax systems,
including methods of apportionment); Finch, supra note 199, at 58 (same).
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Under formula apportionment, multinationals would have an in-
centive to shift formula factors, such as property or employees, to low-
tax countries.2 10 This would cause economic distortions and give rise
to tax competition by countries seeking to attract those factors. The
tax competition would likely be more limited than under the arm's
length approach, however, because multinationals would have to alter
their real business operations in order to minimize taxes.
The unitary method would also present significant compliance
and enforcement problems.21' Multinationals would have to provide
information about their worldwide operations to every country to
which they potentially owed taxes. Unless there were international
agreement on the definition of net income, multinationals would
have to translate the books and accounts of every affiliate to conform
with the tax accounting standards of every country to which they re-
ported.21 2 Each country would have to audit the multinational's
worldwide operations, including transactions that had no connection
to the country. One ameliorating factor, however, is that the informa-
tion required to implement unitary taxation might be more objec-
tively verifiable than the often hypothetical arm's length prices
required to implement the arm's length method.
The success of unitary taxation and formula apportionment at
the state level in the United States (and in other countries with fed-
eral systems) does not demonstrate that it would be successful at the
international level. State corporate income tax rates are generally
much lower than national corporate income tax rates, particularly
when the federal income tax deductibility of state corporate income
taxes is taken into account.213 Because of the lower rates, formula
apportionment is less distortionary in the federal system than it would
be in the international system. Furthermore, formula apportionment
in the United States is facilitated by the existence of a single currency
and by the convergence of state corporate income tax bases, which are
often based on the federal income tax model. Finally, the compliance
and enforcement problems are much easier to solve at the interstate
level than at the international level.
The case for the unitary method and formula apportionment will
become stronger as international business operations become increas-
ingly integrated across national boundaries. Given the drawbacks of
the unitary method, however, it is not clear that international business
210 See Roger Gordon &John D. Wilson, An Examination of Multijurisditional Corporate
Income Taxation Under Formula Apportionmen 54 ECONOMETRICA 1357 (1986).
211 See Finch, supra note 199, at 58; Note, supra note 12, at 1230.
212 See Finch, supra note 199, at 58.
213 I.R.C. § 164(a) (3) (West 1993); see McLure, supra note 198, at 247-48.
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integration has reached the point where this method would be clearly
superior to the arm's length method.2 14
B. Residence-Based Taxation of Corporate Income
Source-based income taxation is difficult to justify on theoretical
grounds.2 15 In particular, source-based taxation is difficult to recon-
cile with the prevailing theory of the income tax as a means of allocat-
ing the cost of government among individuals on the basis of ability to
pay.2 16 Moreover, it is the attempt by governments to tax income on
the basis of source that gives rise to income shifting and to tax compe-
tition among governments. The ultimate solution to these problems
would be to move to an international tax system that uses the resi-
dence of individuals as the exclusive basis for income tax jurisdiction.
A pure residence-based system of income taxation would require
that corporate income be allocated to individual shareholders on a
passthrough basis.2 17 The shareholders would include their allocable
share of corporate income on their personal income tax returns and
pay tax on their total income to their country of residence.2 18 To
avoid double taxation by the residence country, the shareholders
would increase their stock basis by the amount of corporate income
allocated to them. Shareholders would then treat actual corporate
distributions as a return of capital to the extent of their stock basis,
and would treat any excess as capital gain. Withholding taxes on divi-
dends, interest, royalties, and other transnational financial flows
would be eliminated.
The approach described above would replace the classical corpo-
rate income tax system with a pure passthrough integration system,
similar to the current U.S. system for taxing shareholders of sub-
214 Certain businesses, such as global securities trading, might be exceptions. See
Charles T. Plambeck, The Taxation Implications of Global Trading, 48 TAx NoTEs 1143
(1990).
215 See supra text accompanying notes 39-54.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
217 It would be possible to devise a residence-based system at the corporate level by
obtaining international agreement on the definition of corporate "residence" and giving
the residence country exclusive jurisdiction to impose the corporate income tax. It would
be difficult to justify such an allocation of jurisdiction on theoretical grounds, however,
except insofar as the residence of a corporation was a good proxy for the residence of its
individual shareholders. Moreover, if corporations had flexibility to choose their country
of residence, as would likely be the case, the result would be tax competition among coun-
tries to induce corporations to become residents. The end result might be the effective
elimination of corporate income taxation, at least for multinational enterprises.
218 To prevent double taxation, it would be necessary to reach international agree-
ment on the definition of "residence." The United States might have to yield the right to
tax its nonresident citizens to the countries in which they reside. See I.R.C.
§ 7701 (a) (30) (A) (West 1993) (defining a U.S. citizen as a "United States person," subject
to U.S. taxation under the residence principle).
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chapter S corporations. 219 However, any country that wished to retain
a system under which corporate income was taxed. twice could do so
by imposing a separate "corporate income" tax on its resident individ-
ual shareholders with respect to the corporate income allocated to
them.220 Individual countries would be free to set individual income
tax rates (and, if applicable, residence-based corporate income tax
rates) at any level they desired.
This system could be implemented by having each corporation
calculate its taxable income based on its separate accounts, as is done
under current law.2 21 The corporation would then allocate this in-
come among its shareholders, both individual and corporate. This
process would continue through any chains of corporate ownership
until all corporate income was allocated to individual shareholders.
Under this approach, the taxable income of each separate corpo-
rate affiliate of a multinational enterprise would still depend on trans-
fer prices and on the multinational's global financial structure.
However, as long as all of the corporate affiliates of the multinational
were under the same ultimate individual ownership, the total amount
of corporate taxable income passed through to each individual share-
holder would not be affected by income shifting within the multina-
tional. Because all taxes would be paid by individuals exclusively to
their country of residence, income shifting under these circumstances
would have no effect on the tax liability of any taxpayer or on the tax
revenues of any country. If the corporate affiliates of the multina-
tional were not under identical ownership, however, transfer pricing
and financial manipulation could affect tax liabilities and revenues.
In that case, the existence of adverse interests among the individual
shareholders would likely be sufficient to deter income shifting.
Under a residence-based system of corporate income taxation,
corporate income would be taxed identically by the individual share-
holders' countries of residence, regardless of where the corporation
invested its capital and earned its taxable income. International tax
219 I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (West 1993) (subchapter S); see supra note 33 (discussing inte-
gration). The Treasury proposed such a system of integration in 1977, see BLUEPRrNTS FOR
BASIC TAx REFORM, supra note 42, at 68-75, but rejected this approach to integration in
1992 for policy reasons and because of the administrative complexity it would entail. See
TREASURY INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 33, ch. 3. Canada and the Federal Republic of
Germany also considered, but did not adopt, a passthrough approach to integration. See
id- at 27 n.4.
220 Relative to current law, this approach would increase the degree of double taxation
of corporate income, since shareholder-level taxation of undistributed corporate income
would no longer be deferred. In addition, this approach to implementing a separate tax
on corporate income might be unattractive from a political perspective. The political pop-
ularity of the classical corporate income tax is arguably the result of a fiscal illusion, in
particular "to the tendency of all of the parties concerned to believe strongly that it is paid
by someone other than themselves." Vickrey, supra note 197, at 259.
221 See supra text accompanying note 34.
1993]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
competition would be eliminated, except in the form of competition
among countries to be the place of residence of individual sharehold-
ers. Because individuals do not readily move between countries in re-
sponse to tax differentials, it is not likely that this form of tax
competition would be very significant.222
Residence-based taxation does present several potential
problems. First, if each country continued to maintain its own defini-
tion of the corporate income tax base, corporations would have to
calculate their taxable income under the rules of each country in
which any of their ultimate individual shareholders resided. Second,
enforcement would be difficult, because each country would have to
monitor the worldwide operations of every multinational enterprise in
which any of its residents were shareholders. Third, shareholders
might have cash-flow problems, because they would have to pay tax on
the corporate income allocated to them regardless of whether the cor-
porations actually distributed the income.
Thus, as a practical matter, the approach outlined above would
probably be feasible only if governments were to agree on a uniform
definition of the corporate income tax base. Corporations would
then be required to make only a single calculation of their taxable
income. Governments, however, would have to give up sovereignty to
define their own corporate income tax bases. As a consequence, they
would have to forgo using national tax policy as a means of control-
ling corporate behavior.
The shareholder cash-flow problem and the enforcement prob-
lem could be alleviated by imposing a corporate-level income tax
purely as a withholding mechanism. Because this corporate-level tax
would not affect ultimate tax liabilities, it might be relatively easy to
obtain international agreement on the assignment of jurisdiction to
impose the tax. It would be logical to assign corporate-level tax juris-
diction on the basis of ability to enforce the tax. This would likely
mean assigning such jurisdiction exclusively on the basis of the source
of income.
Under this system, each corporation would allocate to sharehold-
ers not only its corporate income, but also tax credits for the amounts
of corporate-level tax that it paid to each country in which it earned
income.223 The tax credits would be refundable by the countries
whose tax gave rise to the credits.2 24 This use of a corporate-level tax
222 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
223 The shareholders would then increase their stock basis by the difference between
their share of before-tax corporate income and their share of corporate-level tax credits.
224 In practice, a clearing-house system could be devised. Under such a system, the
residence country might permit an individual resident shareholder to use the allocated tax
credits against the shareholder's residence-based corporate income tax liability (if the
country imposed such a tax) or against the shareholder's residence-based personal income
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as a withholding mechanism would directly ameliorate the share-
holder cash-flow problem. It would also alleviate the enforcement
problem, at least insofar as the source countries conscientiously en-
forced the corporate-level tax.225
Such a system would entail, however, all of the administrative dif-
ficulties inherent in a system of passthrough integration. To be suc-
cessful, the system would have to address the problems of how to
allocate corporate income among shareholders, 226 how to treat corpo-
rate losses, 227 how to deal with changes in stock ownership during the
reporting period,228 and how to solve various reporting and auditing
issues.2 29
This type of residence-based system would require a high degree
of international agreement and coordination. The system would pro-
vide some benefit, however, even if it were not universally adopted.
Multinationals based in non-participating countries would continue to
be taxed under the current international tax system. With respect to
multinationals based in participating countries, intercompany transac-
tions and financial flows involving subsidiaries located in non-partici-
pating countries would also continue to be taxed under the current
international tax system.
A substantial obstacle to moving to a residence-based system
would be that it would alter the international division of the tax base
in favor of countries that are net exporters of capital ("residence"
countries) and to the detriment of countries that are net importers of
capital ("source" countries). However, many countries that are net
tax liability. If the amount of the shareholder's tax credits exceeded those liabilities, the
residence country would refund the excess amount to the shareholder. The residence
country would then obtain reimbursement from the source countries that collected the
taxes that the residence country credited or reimbursed. For a description of such a sys-
tem, see Alberto Giovannini & James R. Hines, Jr., Capital Right and Tax Competition: Are
There Tiazble Solutions to Both Problems?, in EUROPEAN FNANCIAL INTEGRATION 172 (Alberto
Giovannini & Colin Mayer eds., 1991). See also HughJ. Ault, International Issues in Corporate
Tax Integration, 10 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 461, 484-85, 493 (1978) (discussing proposed
EEC clearing-house system for imputation credits).
A clearing-house system of this type is currently specified for imputation credits in the
income tax treaty between France and Germany. Germany has an imputation credit system
that grants German shareholders in French corporations imputation credits for French
corporate income taxes. Under the treaty, the French government reimburses the Ger-
man government for the cost of the credits (reduced by a withholding tax). See Ault, supra
note 69, at 548.
225 Conscientious enforcement would not be assured. A source country would have no
incentive (short of reciprocity) to expend resources enforcing the corporate-level tax
against a multinational whose shareholders all resided in other countries. On the contrary,
a source country might have an incentive to facilitate tax evasion in an attempt to attract
investment.
226 See TP.Asuax INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 33, at 32-33.
227 See TREAsuRy INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 33, at 30.
228 See TRFasux INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 33, at 33-35.
229 See TREAsuRY INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 33, at 35.
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importers nevertheless export large amounts of capital-they merely
import even more than they export. Such countries would have suffi-
ciently strong residence-country interests that they might support an
effective and efficient residence-based tax system. By contrast, coun-
tries that are not significant exporters of capital, particularly develop-
ing countries, would likely lose tax revenue under an international
system of residence-based corporate income taxation. Note, however,
that participation in the system of residence-based corporate income
taxation would not preclude source countries, including developing
countries, from imposing benefits taxes or taxes on location-specific
rents, such as those based on the extraction of natural resources.
These source-based taxes would not, however, be creditable in the res-
idence country.
C. Interim Approaches
The long-term approaches discussed above would require inter-
national agreement on a new approach in principle as well as on the
details of its implementation. These approaches also would require
countries to make significant changes in their domestic corporate in-
come tax systems, including, at least as a practical matter, a move to
an internationally accepted definition of the corporate income tax
base. There is little likelihood that one of the approaches described
above will achieve widespread acceptance in the near term. Realisti-
cally, therefore, the United States must continue to search for solu-
tions that it can implement either unilaterally or bilaterally on a
reciprocal basis.
1. Taxation of U.S.-based Multinationals on a Consolidated Basis
When the United States taxes a U.S.-based multinational, it is in
principle asserting residence-based jurisdiction, at least to the extent
that the ultimate individual shareholders of the multinational are U.S.
residents. Under the current international tax norms, however, the
United States must yield primary tax jurisdiction to source countries.
The United States accomplishes this through the foreign tax credit
mechanism. Through this mechanism, the United States actually
yields more jurisdiction than is necessary to prevent international
double taxation. Because of deferral, the residual U.S. tax on the in-
come of a U.S. parent corporation's foreign subsidiary is generally
postponed until the income is repatriated.230 If the parent corpora-
tion postpones repatriation indefinitely, the deferral becomes the
equivalent of an exemption. Moreover, because of cross-crediting, a
parent corporation that is in an excess credit position will see its for-
230 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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eign income effectively exempt from residual U.S. taxation even if re-
patriated currently, at least at the margin. 231 Thus, because of
deferral and cross-crediting, the taxation of U.S.-based multinationals
can be equivalent to pure source-based taxation. By eliminating
deferral and cross-crediting, the United States could shift the taxation
of U.S.-based multinationals towards a residence-based system.
The elimination of deferral has been a recurring proposal of in-
ternational tax reform in the United States.232 The debate over defer-
ral generally has focused on the consequences of deferral for foreign
investment, domestic investment, domestic employment, the U.S.
trade balance, economic growth, the distribution of income, the com-
petitiveness of U.S. corporations overseas, and the welfare of develop-
ing countries.2 33 This Article does not revisit these issues, but rather
focuses on the possibility that the elimination of deferral could move
the tax system in the direction of all three of the long-term ap-
proaches discussed earlier.23 4
The United States could take either of two approaches to the
elimination of deferral. The first would be to extend the existing re-
gime of subpart F of the Code.235 Under this regime, a "United States
shareholder" of a "controlled foreign corporation" ("CFC") is taxed as
if the corporation had distributed a pro rata portion of its "subpart F
231 See supra text accompanying note 67.
232 In 1961 the Kennedy Administration proposed eliminating deferral for all foreign
corporations controlled by U.S. persons, with an exception for certain corporations organ-
ized in developing countries. See MESSAGE FROM THE PESIDENr oF THE UNrrED STATES REL-
A=IVE TO OuR FEDERAL TAX Sys-rEM, H.R. Doc. No. 140, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 6-7, 51-56
(1961). Congress scaled down the proposal in enacting the subpart F provisions of the
Code in 1962. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, §§ 951-964, 76 Stat. 960, 1006-27
(1962). Subsequent amendments to subpart F, particularly those in 1986, have substan-
tially broadened the scope of the subpart F rules.
The Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1973, H.R. 62, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973)
(the "Burke-Hartke Bill"), would have eliminated deferral completely. Although this bill
received strong support in Congress, ultimately it was not enacted as law.
In 1978 the Carter Administration proposed the complete elimination of deferral. See
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRxsmEN-r's 1978 TAX PROGRAM: DETAn DEsCRPTIONS
AND SUPPORTnNG ANALYSES OF THE PROPOSALS 282-97 (1978) [hereinafter THE PRSm 'S
1978 TAX PROGRAM].
In 1992 Representatives Rostenkowski and Gradison introduced a bill that included a
proposal to eliminate deferral. Foreign Income Tax Rationalization and Simplification Act
of 1992, H.R. 5270, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201-202 (1992).
233 See, e.g., William W. Park, Fiscal Jurisdiction and Accrual Basis Taxation: Lifting the
Corporate Veil to Tax Foreign Company Profits, 78 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1609 (1978); THE PaRSi-
DENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM, supra note 232, at 282-97; Thomas E. Jenks, Taxation of Foreign
Income, 42 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 537 (1974); Lawrence M. Stone, United States Tax Policy
Toward Foreign Earnings of Multinational Corporations, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 557 (1974).
234 See supra Part VA-B.
235 I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (West Supp. 1993), as amended by Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13231-13233, 13235, 13239; see Kaplan, supra note 102, at 326
(suggesting expansion of the scope of the subpart F regime as a means of combatting
transfer price manipulation).
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income" to the U.S. shareholder as a dividend each year.28 6 For this
purpose, a "United States shareholder" is any U.S. person who owns,
directly or indirectly, at least 10 percent of the voting rights of a for-
eign corporation's stock.2 7 A foreign corporation is a "CFC" if
"United States shareholders" as a group own, directly or indirectly,
more than 50 percent, in terms of either voting rights or value, of the
corporation's stock.238
As originally proposed in 1961,239 the subpart F rules would have
taxed U.S. shareholders as if the CFC had distributed a pro rata por-
tion of all of its earnings each year.240 When Congress enacted the
subpart F rules in 1962, however, it narrowed their scope to eliminate
deferral only with respect to certain types of mobile income that is
shifted to tax haven countries. 241 For example, a multinational can
shift sales income to a tax haven by establishing a subsidiary in the tax
haven to serve as a conduit for the sales. The multinational can maxi-
mize the extent of this shifting by charging the subsidiary artificially
low transfer prices. Thus, "subpart F income" includes sales income,
as well as services income, earned by such conduit subsidiaries. 242
Expansion of the subpart F regime to cover all CFC income
would reduce, but not eliminate, the incentive for transfer pricing and
financial maneuvering. A multinational would still be able to mini-
mize U.S. and global taxes by shifting income from U.S. or foreign
286 More precisely, each U.S. shareholder of a CFC must include in income its pro rata
share of the sum of the CFC's subpart F income for the year, plus amounts relating to the
CFC's investment of earnings in U.S. property or in excess passive assets, plus amounts
relating to previously excluded subpart F income. I.R.C. § 951(a) (1) (West Supp. 1993), as
amended by Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13231(a),
13232(c) (1), (2). The subpart F income of a CFC for any taxable year is limited to the
CFC's earnings and profits for the taxable year. § 952(c) (1) (West Supp. 1993).
237 I.R.C. § 951(b) (West Supp. 1993).
238 I.R.C. § 957(a) (West 1988). Various constructive ownership and stock attribution
rules apply to prevent avoidance. See I.R.C. § 958(a), (b) (West 1988). These ownership
thresholds provide some assurance that the affected U.S. shareholders will be able to con-
trol the CFC. Without such control, shareholders might not be able to obtain the informa-
tion needed to comply with subpart F or to obtain actual dividend payments, which might
be needed to pay the tax liability.
239 See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO OUR FEDERAL
TAX SYSTEM, supra note 232, at 6-7, 51-56.
240 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO OUR FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM, supra note 232, at 7, 51-54.
241 This legislation represented a compromise between the Administration and certain
business interests. These interests argued that complete elimination of deferral would
place U.S. corporations operating in low-tax countries at a tax disadvantage relative to local
corporations and corporations from countries that permitted exemption or deferral of
income earned by foreign subsidiaries. See HousE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 90TH CONG.,
lsr SEss., LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY OF H.R. 10650, 87TH CONGRESS, TiE REVENuE Acr OF 1962,
PUBLIC LAw 87-834, at 464 (1967) (testimony of business representatives).
242 I.R.C. § 952(a) (2), (d) (West Supp. 1993). See generally id. § 952 (definition of "sub-
part F income").
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affiliates reporting a profit to foreign affiliates reporting a loss, since
losses do not flow through to U.S. shareholders under subpart F.
An alternaive approach to eliminating deferral would be to re-
quire U.S. shareholders of a CFC to include currently in income their
pro rata share of the CFC's gross income and deductions, as if they
had earned such gross income and incurred such deductions di-
rectly.243 Thus, losses as well as profits of a CFC would flow through to
the U.S. shareholders. Similarly, the foreign taxes imposed on the
GFC would be treated as if they had been imposed on the U.S. share-
holder directly. The resulting U.S. tax liability of the U.S. shareholder
would closely approximate the amount that it would have incurred if
it had established the CFC as a foreign branch rather than as a foreign
corporation. 244
From the standpoint of neutralizing transfer pricing and financial
maneuvering, this approach would be preferable to the subpart F ap-
proach. Transfer pricing would no longer have any effect on the cal-
culation of a U.S.-based multinational's worldwide taxable income.245
If such a multinational were in an excess credit position, however, it
might still have an incentive to use transfer pricing to shift income to
foreign affiliates in low-tax countries, if by doing so it could increase
the amount of its reported foreign source income and thus increase
the amount of its foreign tax credit limitation. 24 6 This residual incen-
243 This is the approach that the Carter Administration proposed in 1978. See THE
PRESImENT's 1978 TAx PROGRAM, supra note 232, at 292-97.
244 To prevent double U.S. taxation of the income earned by a CFC, a U.S. share-
holder's basis in the stock of a CFC would be increased or decreased as the shareholder
recognized gross income and deductions of the CFC. Actual distributions from the CFC
would reduce the shareholder's stock basis and, if in excess of basis, would be treated as
capital gain.
245 Transfer pricing would, however, have an effect on the calculation of the multina-
tional's foreign tax liability. A U.S.-based multinational in an excess credit position might
have an incentive to use transfer pricing to shift income to the U.S. parent corporation in
order to reduce foreign corporate income taxes. The multinational might also have an
incentive to use transfer pricing to reduce foreign withholding taxes. Thus, continued
enforcement of foreign transfer pricing rules against U.S.-based multinationals would be
required.
246 For example, suppose that Pmanufactures property in the United States and sells it
to its foreign subsidiary S (which might be incorporated in a tax haven) for distribution in
foreign countries. Under the current source-of-income rules, P's gross income from the
sales to S will be part U.S. source income and part foreign source income. I.R.G.
§ 863(b) (2) (West Supp. 1993). If P is in an excess credit position and the United States
has a sufficiently higher corporate income tax rate than the country in which S is incorpo-
rated, the multinational will reduce its global tax liability by decreasing the transfer price
and thus shifting income to S. This will be the case even without deferral, because the
shifted income will be characterized entirely as foreign source gross income rather than
partly as U.S. source gross income.
This analysis assumes that the source-of-income rules would continue to be applied on
a corporation-by-corporation basis, using separate accounting and the arm's length stan-
dard. Alternatively, the source-of-income rules could be applied by ignoring intercompany
transactions and characterizing only transactions with third parties. Transfer pricing
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tive to shift income would be substantially reduced if the United States
were to change from a worldwide foreign tax credit limitation to a per-
country foreign tax credit limitation.247 This change would eliminate
the ability of a U.S.-based multinational to cross-credit foreign taxes
paid to a high-tax country against the residual U.S. tax otherwise due
on income earned in a low-tax country.
Similarly, the placement of debt would no longer have any effect
on the calculation of a U.S.-based multinational's worldwide taxable
income. Interest expense would be currently deductible whether in-
curred by a domestic or foreign affiliate. Moreover, if the multina-
tional's worldwide interest expense were allocated and apportioned
between U.S. source and foreign source gross income on the basis of
the multinational's worldwide assets, 24 8 the placement of debt would
no longer have any effect on the calculation of the multinational's
foreign tax credit limitation. A U.S.-based multinational would then
have no tax incentive to engage in financial maneuvering except, if it
were in an excess credit position, to move debt to foreign affiliates in
order to reduce foreign taxes.2 49
As a mechanical matter, this latter approach to eliminating defer-
ral could be implemented by mandating the extension of existing con-
solidated return rules to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. 250
would then cease to have any effect on the foreign tax credit limitation. However, this
latter approach would likely result in international under-taxation or over-taxation because
the calculation of foreign source income for U.S. foreign tax credit purposes would be
based on a completely different method from the calculation of foreign taxable income for
foreign tax purposes, which presumably would continue to be based on separate account-
ing and the arm's length standard.
247 The Treasury recommended such a change in 1984. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAs-
URY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, Srmpucrr,, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 360-63 (1984). Under
the Treasury's proposal, losses in one foreign country would be allocated to the profits in
other foreign countries when computing the applicable foreign tax credit limitations.
248 The Foreign Income Tax Rationalization and Simplification Act of 1992 included a
proposal to revise the interest expense allocation rules along these lines. H.R. 5270, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess., § 101 (1992). This proposal would be a logical concomitant to the elimi-
nation of deferral, particularly if accomplished by treating U.S.-based multinationals as
consolidated entities. As an administrative matter, however, it might be difficult for the
IRS to audit the allocation of interest expense on the basis of worldwide assets.
249 Thus, foreign countries would continue to be concerned about the thin capitaliza-
tion of local subsidiaries of U.S-based multinationals.
250 See supra note 23 (briefly discussing consolidated return rules); see also William C.
Gifford, Jr., United States Tax Effects of Foreign Losses: A Symmety Analysis, 83 YALE LJ. 312,
354-56 (1973). Cf Foreign Income Tax Rationalization and Simplification Bill of 1992,
H.R 5270, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 202 (1992) (permitting a U.S. shareholder to make an
irrevocable election to treat all of its CFCs as domestic corporations; if this election were
made, 80 percent-owned CFCs would be eligible for tax consolidation); STAFF OFJoINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., IST SEss., PROPOSAL RELATING TO CuRRENT U.S. TAXA-
TION OF CERTAIN OPERATIONS OF CoNTRoLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS (H.R. 2998-AMERI-
CAN JOBS AND MANUFACTURING PRESERVATION Acr OF 1991) AND RELATED ISSuES 52-56
(Comm. Print 1991) (discussing proposal to permit elective treatment of U.S.-controlled
foreign corporations as domestic).
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This would eliminate deferral for foreign subsidiaries that are at least
eighty percent owned by a U.S.-based multinational. It would not
eliminate deferral for less-than-eighty-percent owned subsidiaries or
for foreign corporations owned by individuals. From the standpoint
of neutralizing transfer pricing and financial maneuvering, however,
this coverage would likely be sufficient. The existence of substantial
minority ownership alone would deter manipulative income shifting.
Furthermore, significant international transfer pricing issues seldom
arise with respect to transactions between individual shareholders and
their corporations.
There is no reason, however, why international consolidation
rules could not be more inclusive than either domestic consolidated
return rules or subpart F rules. For example, it might be appropriate
to use the same cutoff in requiring consolidation that is currently used
for allowing an indirect foreign tax credit.2 5 1 Under this approach, a
U.S. corporation owning ten percent or more of the stock of a foreign
corporation would currently take into account its pro rata share of the
foreign corporation's income and deductions, and could claim a for-
eign tax credit for foreign taxes paid on those earnings.
The elimination of deferral by the United States would be a di-
rect, if unilateral, step in the direction of an international tax system
based on the unitary principle. In addition, the elimination of defer-
ral would move the U.S. tax system toward residence-based taxa-
tion.2 52 Finally, to the extent that other countries attempt to design
their tax systems to take maximum advantage of features of the U.S.
tax system, elimination of deferral and cross-crediting would be likely
to enhance the international convergence of corporate income tax
rates and bases.253 The convergence would further harmonize the in-
ternational tax system,r 254 with countries acting unilaterally in their na-
tional self-interest rather than from concerted action. One significant
drawback to such a mechanism for achieving harmonization is that
the tax rate and base would effectively be determined by the domi-
nant capital-exporting country or countries that use worldwide sys-
tems of taxation. Even assuming that those countries were to choose a
251 SeeJoseph Isenbergh, The Foreign Tax Credit: Royalties, Subsidies, and Creditable Taxes,
39 TAx L. REv. 227, 293 (1984).
252 See supra Part V.B.
253 See supra text accompanying notes 173-74. Deferral and cross-crediting give host
countries an incentive to lower their corporate income tax rate below the U.S. rate. In
addition, cross-crediting tends to insulate host countries with relatively high corporate in-
come tax rates from pressure to lower their rates. This insulation can occur because U.S.-
based multinationals might be able to cross-credit taxes paid to such countries against their
residual U.S. tax liability otherwise due on income earned in low-tax countries. In this
case, the high taxes are ultimately borne by the U.S. Treasury rather than by the
multinationals.
254 See supra Part V.A.1.
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rate and base that was optimal from their national perspective, there is
no assurance that it would be optimal from a global perspective.
2. Taxation of Foreign-based Multinationals Using an Imputed
Income Approach
When the United States taxes the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign-
based multinational, it nominally asserts residence-based jurisdiction
under the rule that a U.S. corporation is a "United States person."255
In principle, however, assuming that the ultimate individual share-
holders of the foreign-based multinational are foreign residents, the
United States is asserting source-based jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the arguments favoring international agreement
on a residence-based system of corporate income taxation, the United
States should not unilaterally forgo source-based taxation. If there
were international agreement on a residence-based system, the United
States would increase the tax revenue it collects from residents, be-
cause it would no longer yield to other countries the primary right to
tax such persons on their foreign source income. If, by contrast, the
United States were unilaterally to relinquish source-based taxation, it
would lose the revenue it now collects from foreign persons without
increasing the revenue it collects from residents. In many cases, the
revenue the United States now collects from foreign persons ulti-
mately comes from foreign governments, insofar as those govern-
ments grant their residents foreign tax credits for their payments of
U.S. tax. Under these circumstances, source-based taxation is an effi-
cient source of revenue for the United States. In addition, if the
United States unilaterally relinquished source-based taxation, it might
become a tax haven for direct foreign investment. This would occur if
foreign countries continued to employ territorial or worldwide sys-
tems that allow either deferral or cross-crediting. The result would be
to distort the international allocation of capital.
The conclusion that the United States should not unilaterally
forgo source-based taxation does not necessarily mean that the United
States should continue to tax U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-based mul-
tinationals by allocating income to them in accordance with the arm's
length standard. The justifications for an arm's length standard are
particularly weak if the multinational's home country has a corporate
income tax rate that is approximately equal to the U.S. rate, and the
multinational does not channel its intercompany transactions through
tax haven countries. The arm's length standard is neither internation-
ally accepted nor satisfactorily precise except in very limited circum-
stances. Therefore, the goal of eliminating under-taxation or over-
255 I.R.C. § 7701 (a) (4), (30) (C) (West Supp. 1993).
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taxation could be more surely accomplished if the home country and
the United States were to agree on a more precisely defined and de-
terminate method for allocating income to the U.S. subsidiary.
Although the arm's length standard serves to neutralize the tax incen-
tive for firms to affiliate, this incentive is not significant if the home
country and the United States have similar corporate income tax
rates.
A different neutrality argument sometimes advanced is that a for-
eign-controlled U.S. subsidiary should be required to pay the same
amount of U.S. corporate income tax as a comparable domestically-
controlled U.S. corporation in order to prevent the former from en-
joying a competitive advantage.2 56 This argument ignores the taxes
imposed on the foreign parent corporation. As long as the tax rates
in the home country and the United States are comparable, a foreign-
based multinational will not obtain any global tax advantage by shift-
ing income from a U.S. subsidiary to the parent corporation in the
home country.
Conversely, even if a foreign-controlled U.S. subsidiary and a
comparable domestically-controlled U.S. corporation pay the same
amount of U.S. corporate income tax, there is no assurance that the
global corporate-level tax burdens on the income attributable to the
two U.S. operations will be equal. First, if the home country does not
agree with the United States' allocation of income to the U.S. subsidi-
ary, some of the consolidated income that the United States taxes as
income of the subsidiary might be taxed again by the home country as
income of the parent corporation. Second, in addition to the corpo-
rate income tax that the United States imposes on the foreign-con-
trolled U.S. subsidiary, the United States also imposes withholding
taxes on the dividends, interest, royalties, and similar payments that
the subsidiary makes to the parent corporation. The United States
does not impose such taxes on intercompany payments that a domesti-
cally-controlled U.S. corporation makes to its parent corporation. Fi-
nally, unless the home country employs a territorial system of
international taxation, it will impose its own corporate income tax
256 See, e.g., 1990 Hearings, supra note 5, at 30 (statement of Rep. Schultz). This princi-
ple is also sometimes advocated on grounds of fairness. Id. It makes no sense, however, to
talk of fairness to corporations. Looking through to the individual shareholders, it is not
clear why fairness requires that nonresidents and residents earning the same amount of
U.S. source income should bear the same U.S. tax burden: As discussed above, the justifi-
cations for source-based income taxation and residence-based income taxation are not the
same. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42. Moreover, even with respect to residents,
an international view of horizontal equity would require only that taxpayers with equal
incomes pay equal amounts of global taxes, not necessarily that they pay equal amounts of
taxes to the United States. Such an international view of horizontal equity underlies the
U.S. foreign tax credit mechanism, which attempts to equalize the global (not U.S.) in-
come taxes paid by U.S. persons who earn equal amounts of worldwide income.
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(usually subject to a foreign tax credit) on the earnings of the U.S.
subsidiary when they are repatriated to the foreign parent corporation
as a dividend, as well as on other payments that the U.S. subsidiary
makes to the parent corporation. Ultimately, therefore, the global tax
burden imposed on the earnings of the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign-
based multinational is determined not by the United States, but by the
home country.
This analysis indicates that the United States should focus primar-
ily on two goals in devising a system for taxing U.S. subsidiaries of
foreign-based multinationals: bilateral agreement on the method of
allocating income and determinacy of the results. These goals place
no constraint on the substance of the allocation rule. As a practical
matter, however, the choice will be constrained by revenue neutrality,
in that it is unlikely that either country will accept a rule that it expects
to result in a loss of revenue. The requirement of revenue neutrality
will generally mean that the United States must continue to impose its
corporate income tax on a measure of the U.S. subsidiary's taxable
income that closely approximates the expected arm's length amount of
taxable income for that subsidiary.257
Nevertheless, it is possible that methods based on formula impu-
tation of income to the U.S. subsidiary could be devised that would
satisfy this requirement. For example, income could be imputed to
the U.S. subsidiary based on an annually published rate of return on
assets or gross sales. This rate could be chosen to reflect the profit-
ability of domestically-controlled U.S. firms in the relevant industry.2 58
Any residual consolidated income would then be attributed to the par-
257 In the special case of the United States and a foreign country where the earnings
from cross-border direct investment in both directions are equal, revenue neutrality would
be satisfied by any allocation rule that is applied on a reciprocal basis. This special case will
rarely, if ever, occur. Generally, one of the countries will be a net capital exporter relative
to the other.
258 For a proposed new minimum corporate income tax based on such an approach,
see James E. Wheeler & Richard P. Weber, A New Minimum Tax as a Solution to Inbound and
Outbound Section 482 Problems, the Complexity of the Current, and the Need for More Tax Revenues,
49 TAx NoTEs 793 (1990). The Wheeler-Weber proposal would not eliminate § 482
problems: The minimum tax would be a backstop for the regular corporate income tax,
not a replacement, and liability under the regular corporate income tax would continue to
depend on transfer prices.
For a legislative proposal to tax certain foreign corporations and foreign-controlled
U.S. corporations using such an approach, see Foreign Income Tax Rationalization and
Simplification Act of 1992, H.R. 5270, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 304 (1992). Because this
legislation would impose the approach unilaterally, it would likely violate the provisions of
the United States' bilateral income tax treaties requiring the use of the arm's length stan-
dard and prohibiting discrimination against foreign-controlled taxpayers. See Statement of
Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., supra note 11, at *22-*23.
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ent corporation (or, more generally, to the other affiliates of the
multinational) .259
This methodology would likely result in the imputation of a rela-
tively constant amount of income to the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign-
based multinational. This would be true even in years in which the
subsidiary operated at a loss on a separate-accounting basis, and even
in years in which the multinational as a whole operated at a loss.2 60
Most of the fluctuations in consolidated income would be attributed
to the parent corporation. The home country nevertheless might
agree in advance to such a system of taxation, as long as it concluded
that its expected tax revenue under the imputed income approach
would approximately equal its expected tax revenue under an ap-
proach based on separate accounting and the arm's length standard.
It might be appropriate for the United States to use a relatively low
rate of return for the purpose of imputing income to the U.S. subsidi-
ary, however, since the home country would bear most of the risk of
fluctuations in tax revenues.261
An imputed income approach would represent a move in the di-
rection of unitary taxation and formula apportionment, in the sense
that a portion of the multinational's consolidated income would be
259 If the two countries agreed on a method of taxation based on imputing income to
the U.S. subsidiary, it would be necessary to determine the amount of income properly
reportable by the foreign parent corporation to the home country. In practice, this could
be accomplished, as under the proposed regulations, by working backward from imputed
income to a set of transfer prices. The home country would then use these transfer prices
to determine the parent corporation's taxable income. Note, however, that in working
backward it is possible to determine only an aggregate transfer price, not individual trans-
fer prices. This limitation would be a problem if, for example, the parent corporation
transferred both tangible and intangible property to the U.S. subsidiary. Since the United
States imposes a withholding tax on royalties but not on payments for tangible property, it
would make a difference how the aggregate transfer price was allocated between royalties
for the intangible property and the transfer price for the tangible property.
260 This system might be unduly harsh to the multinational if it operated at a consoli-
dated loss for a year, obtained no home country tax refund based on the loss, and yet had
taxable income imputed to the U.S. subsidiary and taxed by the United States. Start-up
ventures would be particularly likely to face this situation. It might be desirable to have an
exception under which the U.S. subsidiary would be relieved of U.S. taxes under these
circumstances.
261 The countries could devise an imputation method under which the subsidiary's
income would reflect industry-wide or economy-wide fluctuations in earnings, although
there would be a timing problem: If the applicable rate of return were published in ad-
vance of the taxable year, information about industry-wide or economy-wide earnings for
the period would not yet be available. In any case, the home country would still bear the
risk of fluctuations in tax revenues due to firm-specific factors. The aggregate risk from
these factors would be minimal, however, if the imputation methodology were applied to a
large number of firms, because by definition the firm-specific risks faced by different firms
are uncorrelated. In addition, however, the home country would bear the risk of poten-
tially substantial fluctuations in tax revenues due to factors common to U.S. subsidiaries of
multinationals based in the home country, such as the risk of unanticipated exchange rate
fluctuations.
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allocated to the U.S. subsidiary using the imputation formula, with the
remaining portion allocated to the parent corporation. This ap-
proach would, however, differ significantly from the conventional sys-
tem of unitary taxation and formula apportionment.2 62 Under that
system, a positive fraction of the multinational's consolidated income
or loss would be allocated to each affiliate. By contrast, the imputed
income approach might allocate more than 100 percent of the multi-
national's consolidated income to the U.S. subsidiary, leaving a loss to
be allocated to the parent corporation. Similarly, this approach might
allocate income to the U.S. subsidiary even if the multinational exper-
ienced a consolidated loss. In that case, more than 100 percent of the
consolidated loss would be allocated to the parent corporation.
The imputed income approach would also represent a move to-
wards source-based benefits taxation. A benefits tax would be based
on the costs that the taxpaying corporation imposes on the public sec-
tor, including the cost of the public goods and services that the corpo-
ration uses. In general, these costs are not closely related to the
corporation's income.2 63 This is in part because the costs imposed on
the public sector by the corporation need not depend on the out-
comes of the business risks the corporation undertakes, while the in-
come earned by the corporation depends critically on those
outcomes. A tax based on imputed income, as described above, would
resemble a tax on the corporation's assets or sales, with the rate of tax
dependent upon the industry-wide level of profitability but not upon
the outcomes of the unique risks faced by the corporation. This tax
would be likely to reflect benefits more accurately than a true income
tax. The imposition of benefits taxation by .the host country is consis-
tent with the proposal to move to an international system of resi-
dence-based corporate income taxation. 264
It is unlikely that the United States and a foreign country would
be able to agree on a single, universally applicable method of imput-
ing income to U.S. subsidiaries. Variations in circumstances from in-
dustry to industry and multinational to multinational might make it
difficult to find a satisfactory universal approach. Moreover, a signifi-
cant amount of tax revenue would hinge on the actual operation of
any universal method. Neither government might be willing to under-
take such a risk. It might be more feasible for the two governments to
262 See supra Part V.A.2.
263 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
264 Under a system of residence-based corporate income taxation, the host country
would retain the right to impose benefits taxes, but these taxes would not be creditable in
the home country. Indeed, the foreign tax credit would be eliminated. Instead, benefits
taxes would be treated as a deductible cost of doing business. In contrast, the imputed
income approach described above contemplates that the home country will treat the tax as
a creditable income tax if the home country employs a worldwide system of taxation.
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proceed cautiously, experimenting with approaches tailored to a sin-
gle multinational, a limited number of multinationals, or a single in-
dustry. The mechanism for implementing this type of limited
approach already exists in the United States in the form of the ad-
vance pricing agreement procedure. 265 This procedure specifies that
any proposed transfer pricing methodology must be consistent with
the arm's length standard.266 The procedure also states, however, that
taxpayers may propose methodologies other than those specifically
described in the Section 482 regulations.267 Thus, in practice, meth-
odologies other than traditional arm's length approaches are per-
missible even under the current advance pricing agreement
procedure.268
A modest proposal would have the IRS actively encourage U.S.
subsidiaries of foreign-based multinationals to propose advance pric-
ing agreements based on imputed income methodologies rather than
on traditional arm's length pricing methods supported by detailed
economic analysis. If the IRS approved such a method, it would enter
into an advance pricing agreement that would be contingent upon
acceptance of the methodology by all affected foreign tax agencies.2 69
265 Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991-1 C.B. 526. Under the advance pricing agreement proce-
dure, a taxpayer proposes a methodology to be used in determining transfer prices for
specified intercompany transactions. Id. § 2. The taxpayer must provide data showing that
the proposed methodology produces arm's length results. Id. §§ 2, 3.01-3.02, 5. If the IRS
accepts the proposal, the taxpayer and the IRS will execute an advance pricing agreement.
Id. §§ 2, 6.06, 9. In appropriate cases, the IRS also will enter into agreements with foreign
competent authorities regarding the use of the proposed methodology. Id. §§ 2, 7. (The
"competent authority" is the individual representative designated in a tax treaty to carry
out the administrative provisions of the treaty.) Any IRS audit of the taxpayer's transfer
prices while the agreement is in effect will focus on whether the taxpayer set prices in
accordance with the agreement. Id. §§ 9.02, 10.03.
266 Id. § 3.01.
267 Id.
268 For example, two multinational banks have reportedly entered into advance pric-
ing agreements with the IRS under which the income and expenses of their global busi-
nesses are allocated among countries using formula apportionment. SeeJohn Turro, IRS
Grants Two APAs in Derivative Products Area, 4 TAx NoTEs INT'L 959 (1992).
269 If adopted unilaterally, a nontraditional transfer pricing methodology might violate
tax treaty provisions requiring allocation of income based on the arm's length standard
and nondiscrimination against U.S. branches and subsidiaries of foreign corporations. See
U.S. MODEL TREAaY, supra note 7, arts. 7(2) (allocation of income based on arm's length
standard), 9 (same), 24(3), (5) (nondiscrimination). The proposal discussed above does
not involve unilateral action, however. Instead, the competent authorities of all affected
countries and the taxpayer itself would agree on the applicable methodology. U.S. tax
treaties generally authorize the competent authorities to resolve any difficulties or doubts
arising as to the interpretation or application of the treaty by mutual agreement, and in
particular to agree to the same allocation of income from multinational business. See id.
art. 25(3) (a), (b). This mutual agreement provision would appear to authorize competent
authorities to implement the proposal discussed above. If necessary, however, tax treaties
could be amended explicitly to authorize the competent authorities to agree on transfer
pricing methodologies that do not strictly conform to the arm's length principle or the
nondiscrimination rule.
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This approach would give the IRS and foreign tax agencies experi-
ence with how such methods work, which methods work best, what
problems occur, and how those problems can be solved. It would also
enable firms to prepare advance pricing agreement requests at a rela-
tively low cost and would enable the IRS to process a large number of
requests.270 In addition, since firms would not need to disclose much,
if any, sensitive information about their operations in support of their
requests, this approach would alleviate taxpayer concerns that sensi-
tive data might be disclosed to foreign governments and ultimately to
foreign competitors.2 71 Finally, it would enable the IRS to make the
advance pricing agreement process much more open, since both the
requests and the methodologies generally could be made public with-
out disclosing sensitive information.
CONCLUSION
The consequences of transfer pricing and financial maneuvering
can appear very different depending on whether one views them from
a short-term, national perspective or from a long-term, international
perspective. From a short-term, national perspective, the key conse-
quence is the potential erosion of the national corporate income tax
base; from a long-term, international perspective, the key concern is
the potential instability of the international system of income taxa-
tion. While the United States must respond to the threat of the ero-
sion of its tax base, it should evaluate any contemplated responses in
light of their long-term consequences for maintaining the ability of
nations to preserve their systems of comprehensive income taxation.
The ultimate solution to these problems would be to move to an inter-
national system of residence-based income taxation. Although this is
a long-run solution, there are several approaches that the United
States could take in the short run that would alleviate the current
problems of policing against transfer price manipulation and financial
maneuvering. These include taxation of U.S.-based multinationals on
a consolidated basis, and taxation of U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-based
multinationals, pursuant to bilateral agreements with the tax agencies
of the home countries, using formula imputation of income. In addi-
tion to alleviating current problems, these approaches would move
the current U.S. system in the direction of residence-based taxation as
well as in the direction of other possible long-term solutions to the
problem of preserving comprehensive income taxation.
270 See 1990 Hearings, supra note 5, at 349-40 (statement of Roscoe L. EggerJr., former
Commissioner of Internal Revenue) (predicting that many taxpayers will not seek advance
pricing agreements because of the high cost, enormous data requirements, and concerns
about confidentiality).
271 1&j
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